Over 2 lakh Indian cases. Search powered by Google!

Case Details

BRIJ BIHARI LAL versus THE CHAIRMAN, U.P.P.S.C. & OTHERS

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Case Law Search

Indian Supreme Court Cases / Judgements / Legislation

Judgement


Brij Bihari Lal v. The Chairman, U.P.P.S.C. & Others - WRIT - A No. 4487 of 1999 [2007] RD-AH 11328 (6 July 2007)

 

This is an UNCERTIFIED copy for information/reference. For authentic copy please refer to certified copy only. In case of any mistake, please bring it to the notice of Joint Registrar(Copying).

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ALLAHABAD

                                                      Reserved on 27.4.2007

                                                      Delivered on

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.4487 of 1999

Brij Bihari Lal

Versus

The Chairman, U.P. Public Service Commission & others

************

Hon'ble Anjani Kumar, J.

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

Dispute of seniority and consequential promotion is recurring cause of dispute amongst government servants and the present case also raises a similar dispute.

The facts giving rise to the present writ petition, in brief, are, that petitioner, Brij Bihari Lal after selection in competitive examination was appointed on the post of Lower Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as LDA) by order dated 14th October 1972. In pursuance thereof he joined on 1.111972. He was confirmed on the said post on 1st April 1974. The next grade, for which the incumbents working as LDA were entitled to be considered for promotion, was Upper Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as UDA). The conditions of service and recruitment in the said post were governed by U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of service) Regulations, 1942 (hereinafter referred to as 1942 Regulations). Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations, as amended by U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of Service) (Amendment) Regulations, 1971 published on 1st December 1971 provided that the post of UDA would be filled in the following manner:-

"(4) Upper Division Assistant - By competitive examination to be conducted by the Commission which shall be open to the following:

(i) Outsiders:

(ii) Lower Division Assistants (including Treasurer, Accountant and Reference Clerks) who have rendered in the Commission's office a total period of not less than three years' service including officiating or temporary service as counted from the date of approval of the candidate for permanent appointment as on the first day of July of the year in which the examination is held:

Provided that not more than one third of the vacancies occurring in a year shall be filled by promotion under clause (ii) above, if suitable candidates are available."

The aforesaid rule appears to have operated much harsh reducing chances of promotion of LDA to a great extent and thus the Commission took a decision on 5th August 1972 for amendment of the said regulation and sent letter dated 14th March 1973 to the Government proposing amendment in the aforesaid regulation. The aforesaid proposal remained pending before the Government for a long time and in the meantime direct recruitment on the post of UDA was held in 1973, 1978 and 1981 but no recruitment by promotion from LDA to UDA was made in accordance with Regulation 5 Item A sub-regulation (4). On the contrary, the Commission made officiating/ad hoc promotion of LDA to the post of UDA. The petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis as UDA on 13th February 1976. Later on Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) was amended vide U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of Service) (Sixth Amendment) Regulation, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Sixth Amendment Regulation) published on 30th September 1983 and it provides as under:-

"(4) Upper Division Assistants

(i) Two third vacancies by competitive examination to be conducted by the Commission which shall be open to outsiders.

(ii) One third vacancies by promotion from amongst the permanent Reference Clerks, Treasurer, Accountant and Lower Division Assistants of the office of the Public Service Commission;

Provided that in special circumstances the Appointing authority may, with the approval of the Governor fill  up to 50% of the total number of vacancies in any particular year, by promotion as aforesaid."

It is also to be noticed that under Regulation 13 of 1942 Regulations, criteria for promotion was outstanding merit and where merits are equal, the seniority was required to be taken into account. It reads as under:-

"13. Promotion - Recruitment by promotion to the various posts on the stall shall be made for outstanding merit, seniority being taken into account where merits are equal."

The aforesaid regulation 13 was also amended by Sixth Amendment Rules vide notification dated 30th September 1983 as under:-

"13 (1) Recruitment by promotion to the various posts, other than the posts of Upper Division Assistants, shall be made on the basis of merit, seniority being taken into account where merits are equal.

(2) Recruitment by promotion to the posts of Upper Division Assistants shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit for these purpose.

  A combined seniority list shall be prepared in which the names shall be arranged in the following orders :-

(a)Reference Clerks/Treasurer/Accountant, in order of the dates of their substantive appointment in their respective posts, if the date of substantive appointment of two or more persons in the same, the senior in age shall be places higher.

(b) Lower Division Assistants, in order of their inter se seniority as such."

The Commission thereafter by order dated 7th April 1984 regularised promotion of LDAs on the post of UDA against promotion quota and the name of the petitioner was mentioned at serial No.6 against the vacancy of the recruitment year 1978. By another order dated 26th April 1984 the petitioner and various other UDAs were confirmed on the said post. Respondent no.2 issued order dated 26th September 1988 notifying the date of substantive appointment and confirmation of various incumbents appointed/promoted on the post of UDA and the name of the petitioner was shown at serial no.21 mentioning his date of substantive appointment and confirmation on the post of UDA as 1st July 1980. On 29th September 1988 respondents published a tentative seniority list based on the date of confirmation of UDA. The aforesaid seniority became subject matter of dispute before this Court in Writ Petition No.41499 of 1992 and 19777 of 1989. While the aforesaid matters were pending it appears that the petitioner was further promoted as Section Officer in officiating capacity by order dated 31st January 1996 and was regularised on the said post by order dated 5th August 1996 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition). The writ petitions involving seniority dispute on the post of UDA came up for hearing on 26th May 1997 and were disposed of finally by this Court with the following direction:-

"On the facts of the case I direct the petitioners and the respondents concerned to appear before the Chairman, U.P. Public Service Commission with certified copy of this order on 10.6.1997 alongwith any representation which they wish to make annexing any material which they rely on and the Chairman shall fix a date within three week thereafter and on that date he will hear the parties concerned and thereafter pass a speaking order within three weeks of the hearing in accordance with law dealing with the contentions of the parties. Since I have fixed a date before the chairman no separate notices will be sent to the parties.

With these observations this petition and the connection petitions are finally disposed of."

Pursuant to the above directions of this Court, petitioner submitted a representation dated 1st July 1997 requesting that substantive appointment on the post of UDA be treated as 13th February 1976 and seniority should be determined accordingly. The representation of the petitioner and others was decided by the Chairman of the Commission vide order dated 10th July 1997 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) and the Chairman rejected the same observing since regulations were amended only on 30th September 1983 and thereafter regular promotions were made on 7th April 1984, therefore, seniority on the post of UDA cannot be assigned from a date earlier thereto. As a consequence thereof, the Commission passed another order dated 2nd August 1997 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) cancelling selection held for the post of Section Officer on 4th January 1996 and 5th July 1996 and they were given a fresh date of promotion on regular basis as per order dated 12th August 1997. A consequential order was published by the Commission on 13th August 1997 notifying fresh date of substantive appointment on the post of Section Officer, of the petitioner, as 2nd August 1997. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders whereby the date of appointment on the post of Section Officer of the petitioner has been altered, he has filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 10th July 1997, 1st August 1997 and 13th August 1997. Further based on the revised seniority of Section Officer, the Commission made further promotion on the post of Under Secretary and respondents no.4 to 9 have been promoted on the said post vide orders dated 5.11.1997, 4.9.1998 and 13.10.1998. Therefore, the petitioner has also sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders of promotion of respondents no. 6 to 9. He has also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the Commission to treat him as regularly appointed UDA with effect from 13th February 1976 in accordance with regulation 5, item A, sub-regulation (4) as amended on 30th January 1971 and to treat him promoted on the post of Section Officer after expiry of ten years on the post of UDA and redetermine seniority in all the aforesaid cadres accordingly.

The Commission has contested the matter by filing a counter affidavit wherein the facts as stated by the petitioner regarding appointment etc. are not disputed. However, it is said that since promotion of the petitioner as UDA in 1976 was not in accordance with rules and therefore various orders which have been passed by the Commission, impugned in the writ petition, are correct and do not require any interference.

We have heard Sri O.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for the respondents.

Sri Singh has assailed various impugned orders in the writ petition broadly on the following grounds:-

(1) The petitioner was qualified for promotion on the post of UDA, the vacancy was also available, yet the respondents on their own did not make regular promotion and instead granted ad hoc promotion awaiting amendment in regulation 5, item A, sub-regulation (4) and therefore for the fault of the Commission the petitioner cannot be made to suffer.

(2) On the one hand the petitioner is being treated substantively appointed as UDA vide order dated 7th April 1984 and seniority has been determined accordingly but on the other hand respondents no.4 to 9 have been given substantive appointment and treated senior to the petitioner though they had not passed typing test as required under Regulations 15 and 17 of 1942 Regulations. Hence assignment of seniority to respondents no.4 to 9 over petitioner is illegal and arbitrary.

(3) The petitioner was confirmed as UDA and date of confirmation was notified as 1st July 1980 but without giving any show cause notice or opportunity to the petitioner, vide order dated 1st August 1997 the aforesaid order has been cancelled and fresh date of substantive appointment of the petitioner has been notified which is illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly on the post of Section Officer the petitioner was promoted on 31st January 1996 and was regularised by order dated 5th July 1996/5th August 1996 but without giving any show cause notice or opportunity, the same has also been cancelled and new date of substantive appointment and promotion has been notified i.e. 2nd August 1997 which is illegal.  

(4) Due to wrong notification of date of substantive appointment as UDA and Section Officer, seniority of the petitioner has also been wrongly determined qua respondents no.4 to 9 affecting his right of consideration for promotion on higher posts earlier to respondents no.4 to 9 and therefore action of respondents no.1 and 2 is illegal and arbitrary.

In support of the aforesaid contentions Sri Singh cited 1989 SCC (L & S) page 417 - State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyat Karindikar, (Paras 10 & 11), Judgment Today 1996 (4) SC 731 - Pilla Sitaram Patrudu v. Unior of India (Para 3), Judgment Today 1996 (2)  SC 309 - Ashok Kumar Uppal & others v. State of J & K (Para 25 to 29), 2004 SCC  (L & S) 170 - P.N. Premachandra v. State of Kerala (Para 4 & 7), 1997 SCC (L & S ) 1512 - L.K. Sukhija v. Union of India (Para 11 & 12), Judgment Today 2000 (Vol.9) SC 299 - Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of Inida (Para 14, (Column 1st Pg. 318, Para 20).

Learned counsel appearing for the Commission contended that since Regulations were amended on 30th September 1983, therefore, pursuant to the said amendment the petitioner was regularised for the post of UDA against promotion quota. In the circumstances he could not have been treated to be a substantively appointed UDA from a date earlier thereto. Though initially Commission passed certain orders giving said benefit to the petitioner but as soon as the error came to the notice of the Commission, the same has been rectified. The orders impugned in this writ petition, therefore, warrant no interference for the reason that in case the said orders are set aside, they would result in revival of certain illegal orders which were passed in favour of the petitioner earlier. It is contended that in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court would refuse to grant any relief where setting aside an order will result in revival of another illegal order.

Having considered rival submissions and the chequered history of the case in hand we find that it is not in dispute that under Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations, as it stood on its amendment vide notification dated 1st December 1971, the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion on the post of UDA against promotion quota on and after 14th October 1975. The petitioner has categorically stated that no competitive examination, as contemplated under the aforesaid provision, was held permitting LDAs and others i.e. Departmental candidates to be considered for promotion and thereby they were denied right of consideration for promotion to the post of UDA. In Para 4 of the counter affidavit the Commission has admitted this position and has sought to explain that after 1971 amendment, the recruitment for both the sources was made only in 1972 but thereafter the Commission decided not to hold competitive examination for 1/3 vacancies of departmental candidates which were required to be filled in from permanent Treasurers, Accountants, Reference Clerks and  LDAs working in the Commission's office. It sought to fill in those vacancies on the criteria of seniority subject to rejection of unfit for which Regulation was required to be amended and a request to that effect sent to the Government in 1973. It is also admitted that vacancies of direct recruitment quota were filled in by holding selection in 1973, 1978 and 1981 but recruitment from departmental candidates against promotion quota was not made. This also makes clear that substantive and clear vacancies were available for promotion quota and eligible departmental candidates were also available, yet the Commission on its own did not give any opportunity to the departmental candidates for substantive appointment against vacancies of UDA in promotion quota. On the other hand, pursuant to its own decision, gave promotion to such departmental candidates purely on ad hoc  basis.

In our view one of the questions which requires consideration is whether the Commission would be justified in denying seniority to departmental candidates for its own inaction by not filling in vacancies of promotion quota of UDA in accordance with rules while on the other hand consistently making recruitment from another source i.e. outsiders. Where two sources of recruitment are prescribed, it is incumbent upon the employer to make consistent recruitment from both sources simultaneously and within reasonable time gap but if it decides to make recruitment from one source only and refrain from making recruitment from another source, this by itself would be discriminatory, particularly in the absence of any valid justification. The Commission has not explained as to why after 1972 it did not allow departmental candidates to appear in the competitive examination though substantive vacancies on the post of UDA in promotion quota were available. Here there is another misconception, in our view, which had prevailed in the mind of respondent-Commission. It has said that it proceeded to make recruitment against 2/3 vacancies liable to be filled in from outside candidates i.e. direct recruitment and 1/3 vacancies of UDA were awaiting amendment of Regulation changing criteria for selection of departmental candidates to the post of UDA. From reading of Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) proviso we are of the view that even this assumption on the part of respondent-Commission that there was an allotment of 2/3 and 1/3 vacancies for direct recruit and promotees is incorrect. The proviso says that not more than 1/3 of the vacancies occurring in a year shall be filled in by promotion under clause 2 i.e. from departmental candidates, if suitable candidates are available, meaning thereby it provides the maximum limit and it could be lesser in a given case. Therefore, the rule in its true perspective could have been observed only if a combined or simultaneous selection from both the sources would have been made under Regulation 5, Item A, sub rule (4) of 1942 Regulations as amended by Regulation dated 1.10.1971 but the respondents failed to observe the said rule in the aforesaid manner. This clearly has resulted in discrimination qua departmental candidates. The aforesaid Regulation, in our view, did not allow the Commission to continue to hold direct recruitment but not to allow departmental candidates for selection against vacancies available for promotion quota. It is not disputed that petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of UDA and was given ad hoc promotion on the said post on 13th February 1976. Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) was subsequently amended by substitution on 30th September 1983 permitting a clear cut quota of 2/3 and 1/3 for direct recruitment and promotion. It further conferred power upon the appointing authority to fill in 50% of the vacancies in any particular year for promotion with the approval of Governor in special circumstances. Regulation 13 was also amended changing criteria for promotion making it seniority subject to rejection of unfit. The Commission decided to do justice to the departmental candidates by not only recognizing their promotions but relating it back against the relevant recruitment year against which incumbent otherwise would have been promoted or might have been promoted, had regular process of promotion been observed. Consequently the petitioner's promotion on the post of UDA was regularised i.e. made substantive against recruitment year of 1978 vide order dated 7.4.1984. Further vide order dated 26th September 1988 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) the petitioner's date of substantive appointment was notified as  1st July 1980 and he was also confirmed from the said date. These orders were never challenged by any direct recruit or any one else, therefore attained finality. Once the petitioner was substantively appointed with effect from 1st July 1980, the seniority also was liable to be determined according to the date of substantive appointment in view of Regulation 25 of 1942 Regulations which reads as under :-

"25. Seniority - The seniority of a member of the staff shall be determined in the class to which he is appointed by the date of his substantive appointment and, in the case of more than one person being appointed on the same d ate, according to their respective positions on the waiting list, provided that the appointing authority may direct that a member whose period of probation is extended for failure to prove his fitness for confirmation be placed in the seniority list below the last confirmed member."

Regulation 25 does not talk of date of order of substantive appointment but the seniority is to be determined with reference to date of substantive appointment meaning thereby if for one or the other reason an employee has been given a particular date of substantive appointment other than that on which the order is issued, such date would be a valid date for substantive appointment unless it is found contrary to any statutory provision. None has been placed before us. Therefore in our view the petitioner and other promotees whose date of substantive appointment was determined and notified by order dated 26th September 1988 were entitled to have their seniority determined qua other UDAs under Regulation 25 of 1942 Regulations based on the date of substantive appointment. It is true that a tentative seniority list of UDAs was published by the Commission which was challenged in two writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition No.19777 of 1989 and Writ Petition No.41499 of 1992 before this Court but the said seniority list has not been set aside or held inconsistent to law. On the contrary this Court only permitted the petitioners of those writ petitions to make representations before the Chairman who was required to decide such representation in respect to seniority. The validity and correctness of order dated 26th September 1988 or the earlier orders, namely, dated 7th April 1984 whereby promotion of the petitioner on the post of UDA was regularised or order dated 26th April 1984 whereby he was confirmed on the post of UDA were neither under challenge nor were permitted to be considered by the Chairman in any manner. The issue was only with respect to seniority in view of tentative seniority list dated 29th September 1988 and the Chairman  ought to have confined his decision on the said issue only. However, the Chairman in our view has erred in law while deciding representation dated 1st July 1997 of the petitioner vide his order dated 10th July 1997 by observing that since Regulations were amended on 3rd September 1983 and therefore appointment of the petitioner could not have been made substantively from a date earlier thereto ignoring the fact that orders of substantive appointment and confirmation etc. were not subject matter of challenge or dispute before him and having attained finality it was not open to him to pass any order or make any observation in respect thereof. Moreover, earlier orders having been passed by the Commission in the facts and circumstances of the case to do complete justice between the recruitees belonging to two streams and probably for that reason the direct recruits, it  does appear from the record, did not challenge those orders. However, Chairman of the Commission by a complete review of those orders, which were not subject matter of dispute before him, has exceeded his jurisdiction and acted illegally. The only issue raised before the Chairman by the petitioner was that seniority ought to have been allowed from the date of continuous officiation i.e. 13th February 1976 when the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis to the post of UDA. Therefore, he ought to have considered only this much as to whether the entire officiating or ad hoc service could have been considered for seniority or not. But  he exceeded in his jurisdiction and acted illegally by proceeding to review various orders which were not at all in dispute before him. In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 10th July 1997 cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage vehemently contended that if an employee has been given ad hoc promotion and has continued for sufficiently long time, he is entitled for benefit of seniority from the date of continuous officiation and placed reliance on Rajvir Singh and others vs. Unior of India- 1991 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 272, Ashok Kumar Uppal (supra), Rudra Kumar Sen (supra).

In our view the submission is thoroughly misconceived and is liable to be rejected outright. As we have already discussed, Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations as amended in 1971 did not provide a fixed quota for departmental candidates and on the other hand it says that vacancies more than 1/3 shall not be filled in by such candidates. Meaning thereby recruitment of departmental candidates can be or could have been less than one third. There is nothing on record to show that in 1976 when the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis, vacancy in his quota was available. The Commission considered various aspects of the matter and passed order dated 7th April 1984 allotting vacancies in promotion quota to departmental candidates. It is not the case of respondents that order dated 7th April 1984 was challenged or assailed by any one before any competent forum. The Commission allotted vacancies to departmental candidates with reference to years of direct recruitment i.e. 1973, 1978 and 1981 which shows that an honest attempt was made by the Commission to adjust interest of both sources of recruitment and candidates belonging to two streams without causing any injustice or inconvenience to any one. We are not shown that the said order of the Commission has been complained of any one. The said order having attained finality, the Commission passed another order dated 26th April 1984 confirming promotee UDAs who were given substantive appointment against vacancies of 1973, 1978 and 1981 vide earlier order dated 7th April 1984. Even this order has not been challenged by any one. Since for the purpose of determining inter se seniority date of substantive appointment was relevant, therefore, the Commission passed a third order dated 26th September 1988 notifying dates of substantive appointment and confirmation of the various departmental candidates given substantive  promotion on the post of UDA by earlier two orders of 7th April 1984 and 26th April 1984. It is not the case of the parties that even this order caused any grievance to any one. In this view of the matter we do not find any justification on the part of respondent no.1, in the pretext of considering petitioner's claim for benefit of entire officiation, to review all these orders which were never disputed or subject matter of any challenge before him. The exercise undertaken by the Commission in order to adjust equities of the candidates of two streams on account of its earlier failure by not making recruitment from one source though continued to make recruitment from another source was consistent with law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyut Karandikar, 1989 Suppl (1) SCC 393, wherein considering a some what similar situation the Apex Court held as under:-

"Rule 2 of the 1962 Rules no doubt states that a candidate who does not pass the examination at the end of nine years' service will lose his seniority. But this rule cannot be read in isolation as the High Court did. It has to be read along with the other rules since it is a part of the scheme provided for promotion. Rule 5 requires the Government to hold the examination every year. This rule is the basis of the entire scheme and the effect of other rules depends upon holding the examination. If examination is not held in any year, Rule 2 cannot operate to the prejudice of a person who has not exhausted all his chances. The person who has not exhausted the available chances to appear in the examination cannot be denied of his seniority. It would be unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary to penalise a person for the default of the government to hold the examination every year. That does not also appear to be the intent of purpose of the 1962 Rules.

If the examination is not held in any year, the person who has not exhausted all the permissible chances has a right to have his case considered for promotion even if he has completed nine years' service. The government instead of promoting such persons in their turn made them to wait till they passed the examination. They are the persons falling into the category of "Late Passing". To remove the hardship caused to them the government wisely restored their legitimate seniority in the promotional cadre. There is, in our opinion, nothing improper or illegal in this action and indeed, it is in harmony with the object of the 1962 Rules.

This takes to the question whether the government was justified in individual cases to relax the period for passing the examination. It is said that the number of persons falling into this category are not more than five. In the rejoinder filed on behalf of the government, it is stated that the government made some orders extending the period for individuals to pass the examination on administrative grounds or on some genuine hardships. It is also stated that such orders were made upon recommendations by the respective departments and those persons passed the examination within the period extended. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of these statements made in the rejoinder. The power to relax the conditions of the rules to avoid undue hardship in any case or class of cases cannot now be gainsaid. It would be, therefore, futile for the respondents to make any grievance."

Now coming to the question of whether the petitioner would have been entitled to count seniority for the entire period of officiation we are the view that once vacancies in promotion quota were allotted to departmental candidates and date of substantive appointment was also notified which was not challenged by the petitioner at any point of time it was not open to the petitioner to claim seniority from any date other than the date of substantive appointment provided vide orders dated 7th April 1984, 26th April 1984 and 26th September 1988. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that he ever disputed or raised any grievance against the aforesaid orders. It is only when seniority list was prepared, only then, in the garb of disputing seniority list he sought to challenge the date of substantive appointment which was notified by different orders where against no grievance was raised at any point of time. Since Regulation 25 clearly provided that seniority shall count from the date of substantive appointment, the validity thereof is not under challenge, and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner could have been entitled to count seniority from any other date than the date of substantive appointment. The various judgments sought to rely by the petitioner in support of his contention that he was entitled to count seniority from the date of officiation are totally inapplicable since they have been rendered considering different service rules and in different context. None of them has any application to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.

In this view of the matter and in view of the discussion above we have no hesitation to hold that the order dated 10th July 1997 passed by respondent no.1 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The other orders whereby the petitioner's various promotion etc. have been renewed and renotified being consequential to the order dated 10th July 1997, also cannot sustain.

In the result the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 10th July 1997 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. Consequential orders issued by the respondent-Commission being orders dated 2nd August 1997, 10th August 1997 and 13th August 1997 are also quashed. The Commission is directed to determine seniority of the petitioner as UDA on the basis of date of substantive appointment as notified vide order dated 26th September 1988 and to give all consequential benefits accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

Dt:

mhu

                                                      Reserved on 27.4.2007

                                                      Delivered on

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.4487 of 1999

Brij Bihari Lal

Versus

The Chairman, U.P. Public Service Commission & others

************

Hon'ble Anjani Kumar, J.

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

Dispute of seniority and consequential promotion is recurring cause of dispute amongst government servants and the present case also raises a similar dispute.

The facts giving rise to the present writ petition, in brief, are, that petitioner, Brij Bihari Lal after selection in competitive examination was appointed on the post of Lower Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as LDA) by order dated 14th October 1972. In pursuance thereof he joined on 1.111972. He was confirmed on the said post on 1st April 1974. The next grade, for which the incumbents working as LDA were entitled to be considered for promotion, was Upper Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as UDA). The conditions of service and recruitment in the said post were governed by U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of service) Regulations, 1942 (hereinafter referred to as 1942 Regulations). Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations, as amended by U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of Service) (Amendment) Regulations, 1971 published on 1st December 1971 provided that the post of UDA would be filled in the following manner:-

"(4) Upper Division Assistant - By competitive examination to be conducted by the Commission which shall be open to the following:

(i) Outsiders:

(ii) Lower Division Assistants (including Treasurer, Accountant and Reference Clerks) who have rendered in the Commission's office a total period of not less than three years' service including officiating or temporary service as counted from the date of approval of the candidate for permanent appointment as on the first day of July of the year in which the examination is held:

Provided that not more than one third of the vacancies occurring in a year shall be filled by promotion under clause (ii) above, if suitable candidates are available."

The aforesaid rule appears to have operated much harsh reducing chances of promotion of LDA to a great extent and thus the Commission took a decision on 5th August 1972 for amendment of the said regulation and sent letter dated 14th March 1973 to the Government proposing amendment in the aforesaid regulation. The aforesaid proposal remained pending before the Government for a long time and in the meantime direct recruitment on the post of UDA was held in 1973, 1978 and 1981 but no recruitment by promotion from LDA to UDA was made in accordance with Regulation 5 Item A sub-regulation (4). On the contrary, the Commission made officiating/ad hoc promotion of LDA to the post of UDA. The petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis as UDA on 13th February 1976. Later on Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) was amended vide U.P. Public Service Commission Staff (Conditions of Service) (Sixth Amendment) Regulation, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Sixth Amendment Regulation) published on 30th September 1983 and it provides as under:-

"(4) Upper Division Assistants

(i) Two third vacancies by competitive examination to be conducted by the Commission which shall be open to outsiders.

(ii) One third vacancies by promotion from amongst the permanent Reference Clerks, Treasurer, Accountant and Lower Division Assistants of the office of the Public Service Commission;

Provided that in special circumstances the Appointing authority may, with the approval of the Governor fill  up to 50% of the total number of vacancies in any particular year, by promotion as aforesaid."

It is also to be noticed that under Regulation 13 of 1942 Regulations, criteria for promotion was outstanding merit and where merits are equal, the seniority was required to be taken into account. It reads as under:-

"13. Promotion - Recruitment by promotion to the various posts on the stall shall be made for outstanding merit, seniority being taken into account where merits are equal."

The aforesaid regulation 13 was also amended by Sixth Amendment Rules vide notification dated 30th September 1983 as under:-

"13 (1) Recruitment by promotion to the various posts, other than the posts of Upper Division Assistants, shall be made on the basis of merit, seniority being taken into account where merits are equal.

(2) Recruitment by promotion to the posts of Upper Division Assistants shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit for these purpose.

  A combined seniority list shall be prepared in which the names shall be arranged in the following orders :-

(a)Reference Clerks/Treasurer/Accountant, in order of the dates of their substantive appointment in their respective posts, if the date of substantive appointment of two or more persons in the same, the senior in age shall be places higher.

(b) Lower Division Assistants, in order of their inter se seniority as such."

The Commission thereafter by order dated 7th April 1984 regularised promotion of LDAs on the post of UDA against promotion quota and the name of the petitioner was mentioned at serial No.6 against the vacancy of the recruitment year 1978. By another order dated 26th April 1984 the petitioner and various other UDAs were confirmed on the said post. Respondent no.2 issued order dated 26th September 1988 notifying the date of substantive appointment and confirmation of various incumbents appointed/promoted on the post of UDA and the name of the petitioner was shown at serial no.21 mentioning his date of substantive appointment and confirmation on the post of UDA as 1st July 1980. On 29th September 1988 respondents published a tentative seniority list based on the date of confirmation of UDA. The aforesaid seniority became subject matter of dispute before this Court in Writ Petition No.41499 of 1992 and 19777 of 1989. While the aforesaid matters were pending it appears that the petitioner was further promoted as Section Officer in officiating capacity by order dated 31st January 1996 and was regularised on the said post by order dated 5th August 1996 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition). The writ petitions involving seniority dispute on the post of UDA came up for hearing on 26th May 1997 and were disposed of finally by this Court with the following direction:-

"On the facts of the case I direct the petitioners and the respondents concerned to appear before the Chairman, U.P. Public Service Commission with certified copy of this order on 10.6.1997 alongwith any representation which they wish to make annexing any material which they rely on and the Chairman shall fix a date within three week thereafter and on that date he will hear the parties concerned and thereafter pass a speaking order within three weeks of the hearing in accordance with law dealing with the contentions of the parties. Since I have fixed a date before the chairman no separate notices will be sent to the parties.

With these observations this petition and the connection petitions are finally disposed of."

Pursuant to the above directions of this Court, petitioner submitted a representation dated 1st July 1997 requesting that substantive appointment on the post of UDA be treated as 13th February 1976 and seniority should be determined accordingly. The representation of the petitioner and others was decided by the Chairman of the Commission vide order dated 10th July 1997 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) and the Chairman rejected the same observing since regulations were amended only on 30th September 1983 and thereafter regular promotions were made on 7th April 1984, therefore, seniority on the post of UDA cannot be assigned from a date earlier thereto. As a consequence thereof, the Commission passed another order dated 2nd August 1997 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) cancelling selection held for the post of Section Officer on 4th January 1996 and 5th July 1996 and they were given a fresh date of promotion on regular basis as per order dated 12th August 1997. A consequential order was published by the Commission on 13th August 1997 notifying fresh date of substantive appointment on the post of Section Officer, of the petitioner, as 2nd August 1997. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders whereby the date of appointment on the post of Section Officer of the petitioner has been altered, he has filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 10th July 1997, 1st August 1997 and 13th August 1997. Further based on the revised seniority of Section Officer, the Commission made further promotion on the post of Under Secretary and respondents no.4 to 9 have been promoted on the said post vide orders dated 5.11.1997, 4.9.1998 and 13.10.1998. Therefore, the petitioner has also sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders of promotion of respondents no. 6 to 9. He has also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the Commission to treat him as regularly appointed UDA with effect from 13th February 1976 in accordance with regulation 5, item A, sub-regulation (4) as amended on 30th January 1971 and to treat him promoted on the post of Section Officer after expiry of ten years on the post of UDA and redetermine seniority in all the aforesaid cadres accordingly.

The Commission has contested the matter by filing a counter affidavit wherein the facts as stated by the petitioner regarding appointment etc. are not disputed. However, it is said that since promotion of the petitioner as UDA in 1976 was not in accordance with rules and therefore various orders which have been passed by the Commission, impugned in the writ petition, are correct and do not require any interference.

We have heard Sri O.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for the respondents.

Sri Singh has assailed various impugned orders in the writ petition broadly on the following grounds:-

(1) The petitioner was qualified for promotion on the post of UDA, the vacancy was also available, yet the respondents on their own did not make regular promotion and instead granted ad hoc promotion awaiting amendment in regulation 5, item A, sub-regulation (4) and therefore for the fault of the Commission the petitioner cannot be made to suffer.

(2) On the one hand the petitioner is being treated substantively appointed as UDA vide order dated 7th April 1984 and seniority has been determined accordingly but on the other hand respondents no.4 to 9 have been given substantive appointment and treated senior to the petitioner though they had not passed typing test as required under Regulations 15 and 17 of 1942 Regulations. Hence assignment of seniority to respondents no.4 to 9 over petitioner is illegal and arbitrary.

(3) The petitioner was confirmed as UDA and date of confirmation was notified as 1st July 1980 but without giving any show cause notice or opportunity to the petitioner, vide order dated 1st August 1997 the aforesaid order has been cancelled and fresh date of substantive appointment of the petitioner has been notified which is illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly on the post of Section Officer the petitioner was promoted on 31st January 1996 and was regularised by order dated 5th July 1996/5th August 1996 but without giving any show cause notice or opportunity, the same has also been cancelled and new date of substantive appointment and promotion has been notified i.e. 2nd August 1997 which is illegal.  

(4) Due to wrong notification of date of substantive appointment as UDA and Section Officer, seniority of the petitioner has also been wrongly determined qua respondents no.4 to 9 affecting his right of consideration for promotion on higher posts earlier to respondents no.4 to 9 and therefore action of respondents no.1 and 2 is illegal and arbitrary.

In support of the aforesaid contentions Sri Singh cited 1989 SCC (L & S) page 417 - State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyat Karindikar, (Paras 10 & 11), Judgment Today 1996 (4) SC 731 - Pilla Sitaram Patrudu v. Unior of India (Para 3), Judgment Today 1996 (2)  SC 309 - Ashok Kumar Uppal & others v. State of J & K (Para 25 to 29), 2004 SCC  (L & S) 170 - P.N. Premachandra v. State of Kerala (Para 4 & 7), 1997 SCC (L & S ) 1512 - L.K. Sukhija v. Union of India (Para 11 & 12), Judgment Today 2000 (Vol.9) SC 299 - Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of Inida (Para 14, (Column 1st Pg. 318, Para 20).

Learned counsel appearing for the Commission contended that since Regulations were amended on 30th September 1983, therefore, pursuant to the said amendment the petitioner was regularised for the post of UDA against promotion quota. In the circumstances he could not have been treated to be a substantively appointed UDA from a date earlier thereto. Though initially Commission passed certain orders giving said benefit to the petitioner but as soon as the error came to the notice of the Commission, the same has been rectified. The orders impugned in this writ petition, therefore, warrant no interference for the reason that in case the said orders are set aside, they would result in revival of certain illegal orders which were passed in favour of the petitioner earlier. It is contended that in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court would refuse to grant any relief where setting aside an order will result in revival of another illegal order.

Having considered rival submissions and the chequered history of the case in hand we find that it is not in dispute that under Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations, as it stood on its amendment vide notification dated 1st December 1971, the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion on the post of UDA against promotion quota on and after 14th October 1975. The petitioner has categorically stated that no competitive examination, as contemplated under the aforesaid provision, was held permitting LDAs and others i.e. Departmental candidates to be considered for promotion and thereby they were denied right of consideration for promotion to the post of UDA. In Para 4 of the counter affidavit the Commission has admitted this position and has sought to explain that after 1971 amendment, the recruitment for both the sources was made only in 1972 but thereafter the Commission decided not to hold competitive examination for 1/3 vacancies of departmental candidates which were required to be filled in from permanent Treasurers, Accountants, Reference Clerks and  LDAs working in the Commission's office. It sought to fill in those vacancies on the criteria of seniority subject to rejection of unfit for which Regulation was required to be amended and a request to that effect sent to the Government in 1973. It is also admitted that vacancies of direct recruitment quota were filled in by holding selection in 1973, 1978 and 1981 but recruitment from departmental candidates against promotion quota was not made. This also makes clear that substantive and clear vacancies were available for promotion quota and eligible departmental candidates were also available, yet the Commission on its own did not give any opportunity to the departmental candidates for substantive appointment against vacancies of UDA in promotion quota. On the other hand, pursuant to its own decision, gave promotion to such departmental candidates purely on ad hoc  basis.

In our view one of the questions which requires consideration is whether the Commission would be justified in denying seniority to departmental candidates for its own inaction by not filling in vacancies of promotion quota of UDA in accordance with rules while on the other hand consistently making recruitment from another source i.e. outsiders. Where two sources of recruitment are prescribed, it is incumbent upon the employer to make consistent recruitment from both sources simultaneously and within reasonable time gap but if it decides to make recruitment from one source only and refrain from making recruitment from another source, this by itself would be discriminatory, particularly in the absence of any valid justification. The Commission has not explained as to why after 1972 it did not allow departmental candidates to appear in the competitive examination though substantive vacancies on the post of UDA in promotion quota were available. Here there is another misconception, in our view, which had prevailed in the mind of respondent-Commission. It has said that it proceeded to make recruitment against 2/3 vacancies liable to be filled in from outside candidates i.e. direct recruitment and 1/3 vacancies of UDA were awaiting amendment of Regulation changing criteria for selection of departmental candidates to the post of UDA. From reading of Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) proviso we are of the view that even this assumption on the part of respondent-Commission that there was an allotment of 2/3 and 1/3 vacancies for direct recruit and promotees is incorrect. The proviso says that not more than 1/3 of the vacancies occurring in a year shall be filled in by promotion under clause 2 i.e. from departmental candidates, if suitable candidates are available, meaning thereby it provides the maximum limit and it could be lesser in a given case. Therefore, the rule in its true perspective could have been observed only if a combined or simultaneous selection from both the sources would have been made under Regulation 5, Item A, sub rule (4) of 1942 Regulations as amended by Regulation dated 1.10.1971 but the respondents failed to observe the said rule in the aforesaid manner. This clearly has resulted in discrimination qua departmental candidates. The aforesaid Regulation, in our view, did not allow the Commission to continue to hold direct recruitment but not to allow departmental candidates for selection against vacancies available for promotion quota. It is not disputed that petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of UDA and was given ad hoc promotion on the said post on 13th February 1976. Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) was subsequently amended by substitution on 30th September 1983 permitting a clear cut quota of 2/3 and 1/3 for direct recruitment and promotion. It further conferred power upon the appointing authority to fill in 50% of the vacancies in any particular year for promotion with the approval of Governor in special circumstances. Regulation 13 was also amended changing criteria for promotion making it seniority subject to rejection of unfit. The Commission decided to do justice to the departmental candidates by not only recognizing their promotions but relating it back against the relevant recruitment year against which incumbent otherwise would have been promoted or might have been promoted, had regular process of promotion been observed. Consequently the petitioner's promotion on the post of UDA was regularised i.e. made substantive against recruitment year of 1978 vide order dated 7.4.1984. Further vide order dated 26th September 1988 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) the petitioner's date of substantive appointment was notified as  1st July 1980 and he was also confirmed from the said date. These orders were never challenged by any direct recruit or any one else, therefore attained finality. Once the petitioner was substantively appointed with effect from 1st July 1980, the seniority also was liable to be determined according to the date of substantive appointment in view of Regulation 25 of 1942 Regulations which reads as under :-

"25. Seniority - The seniority of a member of the staff shall be determined in the class to which he is appointed by the date of his substantive appointment and, in the case of more than one person being appointed on the same d ate, according to their respective positions on the waiting list, provided that the appointing authority may direct that a member whose period of probation is extended for failure to prove his fitness for confirmation be placed in the seniority list below the last confirmed member."

Regulation 25 does not talk of date of order of substantive appointment but the seniority is to be determined with reference to date of substantive appointment meaning thereby if for one or the other reason an employee has been given a particular date of substantive appointment other than that on which the order is issued, such date would be a valid date for substantive appointment unless it is found contrary to any statutory provision. None has been placed before us. Therefore in our view the petitioner and other promotees whose date of substantive appointment was determined and notified by order dated 26th September 1988 were entitled to have their seniority determined qua other UDAs under Regulation 25 of 1942 Regulations based on the date of substantive appointment. It is true that a tentative seniority list of UDAs was published by the Commission which was challenged in two writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition No.19777 of 1989 and Writ Petition No.41499 of 1992 before this Court but the said seniority list has not been set aside or held inconsistent to law. On the contrary this Court only permitted the petitioners of those writ petitions to make representations before the Chairman who was required to decide such representation in respect to seniority. The validity and correctness of order dated 26th September 1988 or the earlier orders, namely, dated 7th April 1984 whereby promotion of the petitioner on the post of UDA was regularised or order dated 26th April 1984 whereby he was confirmed on the post of UDA were neither under challenge nor were permitted to be considered by the Chairman in any manner. The issue was only with respect to seniority in view of tentative seniority list dated 29th September 1988 and the Chairman  ought to have confined his decision on the said issue only. However, the Chairman in our view has erred in law while deciding representation dated 1st July 1997 of the petitioner vide his order dated 10th July 1997 by observing that since Regulations were amended on 3rd September 1983 and therefore appointment of the petitioner could not have been made substantively from a date earlier thereto ignoring the fact that orders of substantive appointment and confirmation etc. were not subject matter of challenge or dispute before him and having attained finality it was not open to him to pass any order or make any observation in respect thereof. Moreover, earlier orders having been passed by the Commission in the facts and circumstances of the case to do complete justice between the recruitees belonging to two streams and probably for that reason the direct recruits, it  does appear from the record, did not challenge those orders. However, Chairman of the Commission by a complete review of those orders, which were not subject matter of dispute before him, has exceeded his jurisdiction and acted illegally. The only issue raised before the Chairman by the petitioner was that seniority ought to have been allowed from the date of continuous officiation i.e. 13th February 1976 when the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis to the post of UDA. Therefore, he ought to have considered only this much as to whether the entire officiating or ad hoc service could have been considered for seniority or not. But  he exceeded in his jurisdiction and acted illegally by proceeding to review various orders which were not at all in dispute before him. In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 10th July 1997 cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage vehemently contended that if an employee has been given ad hoc promotion and has continued for sufficiently long time, he is entitled for benefit of seniority from the date of continuous officiation and placed reliance on Rajvir Singh and others vs. Unior of India- 1991 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 272, Ashok Kumar Uppal (supra), Rudra Kumar Sen (supra).

In our view the submission is thoroughly misconceived and is liable to be rejected outright. As we have already discussed, Regulation 5, Item A, sub-regulation (4) of 1942 Regulations as amended in 1971 did not provide a fixed quota for departmental candidates and on the other hand it says that vacancies more than 1/3 shall not be filled in by such candidates. Meaning thereby recruitment of departmental candidates can be or could have been less than one third. There is nothing on record to show that in 1976 when the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis, vacancy in his quota was available. The Commission considered various aspects of the matter and passed order dated 7th April 1984 allotting vacancies in promotion quota to departmental candidates. It is not the case of respondents that order dated 7th April 1984 was challenged or assailed by any one before any competent forum. The Commission allotted vacancies to departmental candidates with reference to years of direct recruitment i.e. 1973, 1978 and 1981 which shows that an honest attempt was made by the Commission to adjust interest of both sources of recruitment and candidates belonging to two streams without causing any injustice or inconvenience to any one. We are not shown that the said order of the Commission has been complained of any one. The said order having attained finality, the Commission passed another order dated 26th April 1984 confirming promotee UDAs who were given substantive appointment against vacancies of 1973, 1978 and 1981 vide earlier order dated 7th April 1984. Even this order has not been challenged by any one. Since for the purpose of determining inter se seniority date of substantive appointment was relevant, therefore, the Commission passed a third order dated 26th September 1988 notifying dates of substantive appointment and confirmation of the various departmental candidates given substantive  promotion on the post of UDA by earlier two orders of 7th April 1984 and 26th April 1984. It is not the case of the parties that even this order caused any grievance to any one. In this view of the matter we do not find any justification on the part of respondent no.1, in the pretext of considering petitioner's claim for benefit of entire officiation, to review all these orders which were never disputed or subject matter of any challenge before him. The exercise undertaken by the Commission in order to adjust equities of the candidates of two streams on account of its earlier failure by not making recruitment from one source though continued to make recruitment from another source was consistent with law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyut Karandikar, 1989 Suppl (1) SCC 393, wherein considering a some what similar situation the Apex Court held as under:-

"Rule 2 of the 1962 Rules no doubt states that a candidate who does not pass the examination at the end of nine years' service will lose his seniority. But this rule cannot be read in isolation as the High Court did. It has to be read along with the other rules since it is a part of the scheme provided for promotion. Rule 5 requires the Government to hold the examination every year. This rule is the basis of the entire scheme and the effect of other rules depends upon holding the examination. If examination is not held in any year, Rule 2 cannot operate to the prejudice of a person who has not exhausted all his chances. The person who has not exhausted the available chances to appear in the examination cannot be denied of his seniority. It would be unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary to penalise a person for the default of the government to hold the examination every year. That does not also appear to be the intent of purpose of the 1962 Rules.

If the examination is not held in any year, the person who has not exhausted all the permissible chances has a right to have his case considered for promotion even if he has completed nine years' service. The government instead of promoting such persons in their turn made them to wait till they passed the examination. They are the persons falling into the category of "Late Passing". To remove the hardship caused to them the government wisely restored their legitimate seniority in the promotional cadre. There is, in our opinion, nothing improper or illegal in this action and indeed, it is in harmony with the object of the 1962 Rules.

This takes to the question whether the government was justified in individual cases to relax the period for passing the examination. It is said that the number of persons falling into this category are not more than five. In the rejoinder filed on behalf of the government, it is stated that the government made some orders extending the period for individuals to pass the examination on administrative grounds or on some genuine hardships. It is also stated that such orders were made upon recommendations by the respective departments and those persons passed the examination within the period extended. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of these statements made in the rejoinder. The power to relax the conditions of the rules to avoid undue hardship in any case or class of cases cannot now be gainsaid. It would be, therefore, futile for the respondents to make any grievance."

Now coming to the question of whether the petitioner would have been entitled to count seniority for the entire period of officiation we are the view that once vacancies in promotion quota were allotted to departmental candidates and date of substantive appointment was also notified which was not challenged by the petitioner at any point of time it was not open to the petitioner to claim seniority from any date other than the date of substantive appointment provided vide orders dated 7th April 1984, 26th April 1984 and 26th September 1988. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that he ever disputed or raised any grievance against the aforesaid orders. It is only when seniority list was prepared, only then, in the garb of disputing seniority list he sought to challenge the date of substantive appointment which was notified by different orders where against no grievance was raised at any point of time. Since Regulation 25 clearly provided that seniority shall count from the date of substantive appointment, the validity thereof is not under challenge, and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner could have been entitled to count seniority from any other date than the date of substantive appointment. The various judgments sought to rely by the petitioner in support of his contention that he was entitled to count seniority from the date of officiation are totally inapplicable since they have been rendered considering different service rules and in different context. None of them has any application to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.

In this view of the matter and in view of the discussion above we have no hesitation to hold that the order dated 10th July 1997 passed by respondent no.1 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The other orders whereby the petitioner's various promotion etc. have been renewed and renotified being consequential to the order dated 10th July 1997, also cannot sustain.

In the result the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 10th July 1997 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. Consequential orders issued by the respondent-Commission being orders dated 2nd August 1997, 10th August 1997 and 13th August 1997 are also quashed. The Commission is directed to determine seniority of the petitioner as UDA on the basis of date of substantive appointment as notified vide order dated 26th September 1988 and to give all consequential benefits accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

Dt:

mhu


Copyright

Reproduced in accordance with s52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court Websites

Advertisement

dwi Attorney | dui attorney | dwi | dui | austin attorney | san diego attorney | houston attorney | california attorney | washington attorney | minnesota attorney | dallas attorney | alaska attorney | los angeles attorney | dwi | dui | colorado attorney | new york attorney | new jersey attorney | san francisco attorney | seattle attorney | florida attorney | attorney | london lawyer | lawyer michigan | law firm |

Tip:
Double Click on any word for its dictionary meaning or to get reference material on it.