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Baij Nath Yadav v. Union Of India & Others - WRIT - A No. 3006 of 2003  RD-AH 8365 (4 May 2007)
Court No. 10
CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION NO. 3006 OF 2003.
Baij Nath Yadav ...Petitioner.
Union of India and others ....Respondents.
Hon'ble Anjani Kumar, J.
Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
Aggrieved by the order dated 15th May, 2000 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad (hereafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') rejecting Original Application No. 2084 of 2000 filed by the petitioner, he has filed this writ petition.
The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner was denied medical leave (Hospital leave) for the period 30.12.1989 to 10.12.1990. He filed an application under Section 198 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 1985 Act) registered as Original Application No. 966 of 1990. The Tribunal allowed the said application vide judgement dated 14.8.1996 with the following directions:
"Consequently, the said benefit cannot be denied to the applicant in the present case. We therefore, hold, that the applicant is entitled for hospital leave. The respondents, are therefore, directed to consider the application for grant of hospital leave and dispose of the same within six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgement. The O.A. is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs."
The petitioner sent the order dated dated 14th August, 1996 along with his letter dated 5th October, 1996 addressed to the Commandant, 508 Army Base Workshop, EME Fort, Allahabad who was impleaded as respondent No. 4 in the Original Application. The respondents however, did not comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal. Thereafter the petitioner filed a Contempt Petition No. 104 of 1997 before the Tribunal which remained pending and during its pendency, he preferred an application under Section 27 read with Rule 24 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 1987 Rules) with the following prayer:
(i) to allow this application of the applicant and the respondents may be directed to comply with the judgement dated 14.8.96 passed by this Hon'ble Tribunal in O. A. No. 966 of 1990 within an appropriate and fixed period as may be deemed fit and proper by this Hon'ble Tribunal.
(ii) To direct the respondents to pay the arrears of the aforesaid hospital leave along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon.
(iii) To pass any other or further order and direction which may be deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
Thus, application has been rejected by the Tribunal by the order impugned in the present writ petition on the ground that the application having been filed after more than an year, no such direction can be issued and reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hukam Raj Khinvsara Versus Union of of India and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 2100
Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the judgement of the Tribunal having attained finality it was incumbent upon the respondents to comply with the same and if it has failed to do so, the direction of the Tribunal would not become a waste paper but the Tribunal has sufficient power to issue such directions as may be required to give effect to the same. He also contended that the rejection of the petitioner's application relying upon the case of Hukam Raj Khinvsara (supra) is erroneous.
We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the records.
It is no doubt true that an application under Section 27 of 1985 Act could have been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Act as held by the Apex Court in the case of Hukam Raj Khinvsara (supra) if an application would have been filed by the petitioner only under Section 27 of 1985 Act, the order passed by the Tribunal could not have been said to be erroneous since it was filed after more than one year of the final order of the Tribunal dated 14th August, 1996. However, the petitioner preferred the aforesaid application by referring to Rule 24 of the 1987 Rules. It was not the case before the Apex Court in the case of Hukam Raj Khinvsara (supra), therefore, rejection of the application relying upon this judgement in its entirety cannot be sustained. Rule 24 of 1987 Rules is reproduced as under:
"24. Order and directions in certain cases.__The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice."
1987 Rules have been framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 35 (2) (b), (e) and (f) read with Section 36 ( c ) of 1985 Act. The Act gives wide enough powers to the Tribunal to pass such orders so as to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. The judgement passed by the Tribunal was final and the said judgement cannot be said to be a waste paper or a document without power or authority. It would not be energyless or becomes a fused bomb. Even if it is not executable under Section 27 of the Act, the Tribunal could have issued appropriate directions to the respondents to meet the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process by the respondents by referring to Rule 24 of 1987 Rules. In our view the Tribunal while rejecting the application has failed to exercise its power under Rule 24 of 1987 Rules and has erred in law by relying upon Hukam Raj Khinvsara (supra) though in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said direction was not applicable. Therefore, the order dated 15th May, 2000 passed by the Tribunal cannot sustain and is hereby quashed.
Moreover, the petitioner has come up before this Court under the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not disputed by the respondents that the order dated 14th August, 1996 passed by the Tribunal is binding upon the respondents. It is also not disputed that the said order attained finality having not been challenged by the respondents before any higher forum. That being so, in our view it would be in the interest of justice that the respondents be commanded to comply with the order dated 14th August, 1996 and pass appropriate order in the light of the directions issued thereunder within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of the this order. before the competent authority. In case any amount is found payable to the petitioner, the same shall be paid to the petitioner within two months thereafter.
The writ petition is allowed with the aforesaid direction. No order as to costs.
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