High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd & Another v. Shri Kishan Dass - SECOND APPEAL No. 297 of 2006  RD-AH 9562 (18 May 2007)
Second Appeal No. 297 2006
U.P. State Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr.
Shri Kishan Das
Hon. Dilip Gupta, J.
The defendants have filed this Second Appeal for setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad by which the Civil Appeal that had been filed by them for setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was dismissed.
The Original Suit had been filed to restrain the defendants permanently from determining the lease dated 26th August, 1971 and claim re-entry. A declaration was also sought that the letter dated 21st July, 1986 purporting to determine the lease and all acts of defendants in that respect were null and void.
It was asserted that the plaintiff was allotted Plot No.36 in the Industrial Area for a period of 90 years by the registered lease deed dated 26th August, 1971 and he had also paid the full consideration of Rs.1,06,473.30. However, the defendants sent a letter dated 21st July, 1987 mentioning therein that by the letter dated 23rd May, 1987 they had determined the lease of the plaintiff and had also forfeited the money paid. The defendants contested the suit asserting that the lease deed had been cancelled since the terms and conditions had not been complied with by the plaintiff. The Trial Court decreed the suit. The Appellate Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal holding that the lease of the plaintiff had not been determined by serving the notice as was required under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982. The Lower Appellate Court also held that there was no breach of the conditions of the lease deed.
I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent.
Both the Courts below have recorded a categorical finding of fact in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to substantiate that any of the finding recorded is perverse. No substantial question of law, therefore, arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. It is, accordingly, liable to be dismissed.
Learned counsel for the appellants, however, submitted in the end that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court as confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court may not be construed to mean that the appellants cannot take action for breach of conditions of lease in future. The apprehension of the learned counsel for the appellants is misconceived as the judgments of the Courts below are based on the communication dated 21st July, 1987 sent by the defendants and it is on the basis of this communication alone that the defendants have been restrained from determining the plaintiff's lease and for restraining them from claiming re-entry.
The Second Appeal is dismissed.
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