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ASHOK KUMAR JHA v NARENDRA SINGH & ORS - CMA Case No. 05097 of 2004  RD-RJ 907 (26 April 2005)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
CIVIL MISC. APPEAL No. 05097 of 2004
ASHOK KUMAR JHA
NARENDRA SINGH & ORS
Mr. T.GUPTA, for the appellant / petitioner
Date of Order : 26.4.2005
HON'BLE SHRI N P GUPTA,J.
Heard learned counsel for the appellant, and perused the application.
The appellant has filed the application purportedly under Sec.173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. According to second proviso thereof, this court can entertain the appeal, if filed after the prescribed period, in case, this court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing appeal within time. This provision is akin to the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. It is significant to note that the application is not supported by even affidavit, nor signed by the appellant. With this, it is alleged in the application that the impugned award was passed on 12.4.2004. The application for certified copy was filed on 15.2.2003, and was received on 10.5.2004. I find from the certified copy that it was not applied on 15.2.2003, but was applied on 15.4.2004. Obviously, averments mentioned in the application, appear to be a typographical mistake, but then this, thus shows that the averments of the application cannot be taken on the face value, and it is alleged that information was sent to the appellant, but due to his being on tour and out of station for field duty, he could not be informed, and it was only in the month of September that he could be contacted when he contacted the counsel about the progress of the case. The appellant is resident of a place where Tribunal is situated, and there is nothing to show that even all these period, the appellant had never been to Head-quarter. The appellant is on field duty or tour, or out of station, still in the present age, if the information was sent to him, it must have been conveyed to him by
Thus, in my view, the facts disclosed in the application do not make out any sufficient ground whereby appellant may have been prevented from preferring the appeal in time within the meaning of second proviso of Sec.173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The application for condonation of delay is, therefore, dismissed, and consequently, the appeal is also dismissed as time barred.
( N P GUPTA ),J. /Srawat/
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