Over 2 lakh Indian cases. Search powered by Google!

Case Details

P.GHOUSE BASHA versus THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER AND

High Court of Madras

Case Law Search

Indian Supreme Court Cases / Judgements / Legislation

Judgement


P.Ghouse Basha v. The Special Commissioner and - WRIT PETITION NO.23971 of 2002 and WRIT PETITION NO.23972/2002 [2002] RD-TN 448 (9 July 2002)



IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS



DATED: 09/07/2002

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.KANAGARAJ

WRIT PETITION NO.23971 of 2002 and WRIT PETITION NO.23972/2002 AND

W.P.M.P.NOS.32948 TO 32950 OF 2002.

P.Ghouse Basha ..Petitioner in WP.23971/2002 M.Sivappa ..Petitioner in WP.23972/2002 Vs.

1.The Special Commissioner and

Commissioner of Civil Supplies and

Consumer Protection, Chennai-600 005.

2.The Additional District Magistrate-cum-

The District Revenue Officer,

Dharmapuri.

3.The Tahsildar, Krishnagiri Taluk,

Dharmapuri District. .. Respondents in both Wps. Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to grant writs of Certiorarified Mandamus as stated therein. For petitioners in

both the Wps. : Mr.R.Gandhi, Senior counsel for M/s.R.G.Narendhiran

For respondents : Mr.S.Venkatesh, A.G.P.

:COMMON ORDER



Both the above writ petitions are filed praying to issue Writs of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the second respondent respectively in O.Mu.No.96160/2001 and O.Mu.No.94043/2001, both dated 28.12.2001 and quash the same and direct the respondents to renew the petitioners licences to store diesel for the period from 1.1.200 2 to 31.12.2004.

2. On a perusal of the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, it comes to be known that both the petitioners were granted licences by the second respondent under the Petroleum Act to import 2000 litres of petroleum Class-B on 28.7.1992 and they were renewed periodically; that when the second respondent cancelled their licences by proceedings dated 21.6.1999, they filed W. Ps.11239 and 11350 of 1999 before this Court and a learned single Judge of this Court, by a common order dated 14.9.1999 allowed both the writ petitions on ground that the second respondent has not issued any notice to the petitioners, before cancelling their licences, but, however, given liberty to the second respondent/D.R.O. to take further action, if necessary, after giving due opportunity and notice to the petitioners.

3. It further comes to be known that thereupon, by the orders dated 4.2.2000, the D.R.O. cancelled the licences of the petitioners relying on a communication received from the first respondent dated 31.5.1 999, which reads that the issue of licence for retail sale of motor spirit and high speed diesel by D.R.O. is violative of Clause 3(vii) of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply and Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order) and hence to take corrective action immediately. Challenging the said cancellation of their licences, the petitioners again filed W.P.Nos.4413 and 4416 of 2000 before this Court and a learned single Judge of this Court, by order dated 10.8.2000, allowed the said writ petitions and since the main contention of the petitioners therein is that though the respondents have relied on the order of the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, they have not been furnished with a copy of the same, the learned Judge directed the authorities to furnish copy of the said proceedings dated 31.5.1999 to the petitioners and pass orders after giving opportunity to the petitioners. Afterwards, the respondents issued notices to the petitioners dated 25.10.2000 thereby furnishing a copy of the order of the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, and the petitioners submitted their explanations on 16.11.2000. Thereupon, the second respondent, by his proceeding dated 13.12.2000 cancelled the licences issued to the petitioners. However, the petitioners, on 5.12.2001, have filed petitions seeking renewal of their licences as though their licences were still in force, in spite of the fact that their licences have been cancelled, as aforementioned, for which the second respondent has rejected their applications for renewal of their licences as per the impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 with the remarks that since their very licences have been cancelled as per his order dated 13.12.2000 itself, the question of renewal of the same for a further term does not arise at all.

4. The main contention of the petitioners is that they were granted the licences under the Petroleum Act and now, the second respondent cancelled their licences pursuant to the order of the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, which says that granting of licences by the DRO is violative of Order 3 (vii) of the Control Order. The said Control Order, according to the petitioners, cannot have any overriding effect over the Petroleum Act and hence their licences cannot be cancelled based on such an order passed by the first respondent.

5. In support of their contention, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would rely on a judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered in THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY vs. BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1993 Bombay 54, wherein by a notification No.P.104, dated 4.5.1950 issued under Section 31 of the Petroleum Act, 1934, the operation of Section 394 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 was restricted, insofar as it related to storage and transportation of petroleum products and the Bombay High has held: "There was a repugnancy between the Central Act i.e. Petroleum Act and the State Act i.e. The Corporation Act ... it is clear that to the extent of notified category, there is a conflict between the two enactments and therefore to the extent of notified category, S.394 of the Corporation Act will have no application. The Petroleum Act therefore will supercede the provisions of S.394 of the Corporation Act, by virtue of Art.254 of the Constitution."

6. On 4.7.2002, when the above writ petitions came up for admission in the presence of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the Additional Government Pleader taking notice on behalf of the respondents and resisting the same, emphasis was laid on the part of the petitioners to the prayers of the writ petitions to quash the impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 and to renew the petitioners' licences to store diesel for the period from 1.1.2002 to 31.12.2004.

7. The impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 are nothing but replies to the request of the petitioners made on 5.12.2001 to renew their licences to keep diesel and petrol in the addresses mentioned therein, since their licences were to expire on 31.12.2001, for a further term of three years i.e. till 31.12.2004.

8. In answer to the said renewal for three years requested by the petitioners as per their applications dated 5.12.2001, the impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 have been passed by the second respondent not only revealing that as early as on 13.12.2000 itself, the petitioners' very licences were cancelled as seen in reference No.2 of the orders impugned but also asserting that the petitioners are not entitled to get anymore licences of that sort since possession of the essential commodities such as diesel or petrol by the petitioners or granting of the very licences by the authorities is violative of Order 3 (vii) of the Control Order.

9. In the above scenario, the petitioners, in spite of having known that their licences have been cancelled by the order of the authority dated 13.12.2000 itself, after one year of such cancellation, had filed applications to the same authority, the District Revenue Officer, for renewal of the licences for a further period of three years, which is nothing but a fraud and cheating perpetrated by the petitioners on the designated authority in spite of knowing that their licences were cancelled as early as on 13.12.2000 and they could not be renewed any further much less by those applications made after one year of such cancellation.

10. It is under these circumstances, in reply to such fraudulent applications filed on the part of the petitioners, the second respondent/District Revenue Officer and the Licensing Authority had passed the impugned orders stating thereby that since the licences issued in their favour had been repugnant to or violative of Order 3(vii) of the Control Order and further on account of the same reason their licences had already been cancelled, the question of renewing the same does not at all arise, thus expressing his inability to renew the licences which were non-existent on the date of the applications of the petitioners for renewal.

11. It is relevant to note that many writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners in the past and directions have been issued in every such writ petition to the second respondent and ultimately, in full consideration of all the representations made on the part of the petitioners, the second respondent had passed the ultimate orders dated 13.12.2000 thereby cancelling the licences of the petitioners and in spite of full knowledge of the cancellation of the said licences, the petitioners had filed applications for renewal of the cancelled licences as per their applications dated 5.12.2001 i.e. roughly after one year of the cancellation of the licences thereby giving an impression to the second respondent Licensing Authority as though the said licences had been in force and were only expiring on 31.12.2001, which is nothing but a calculated fraud played by the petitioners with the Licensing Authority. In the above circumstances, the lower authority has not only declined to pass any order on such renewal applications but also has disclosed the fraud perpetrated on the part of the petitioners making the Licensing Authority believe that their licences (which had been cancelled as early as on 13.12.2000) were still in force and were going to expire only on 31.12.2001 thus seeking the renewal of the same, which must be taken serious note of.

12. While such being the fact, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would strive hard to convince the Court, citing a judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in A.I.R. 1993 Bombay 53 wherein by a notification dated 4.5.1950 issued under Section 31 of the Petroleum Act, 1934, the operation of Section 394 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 was restricted insofar as it related to storage and transportation of petroleum products and the said High Court observed that `there was a repugnancy between the Central Act i.e. Petroleum Act and the State Act i.e. The Corporation Act' further remarking that `it is clear that to the extent of notified category, there is a conflict between the two enactments and therefore to the extent of notified category, Section 394 of the Corporation Act will have no application and the Petroleum Act will supercede the provisions of Section 394 of the Corporation Act by virtue of Section 254 of the Constitution of India.'

13. The above judgment has absolutely no application to the cases in hand since there is neither repugnancy nor conflict between a Central legislation and the State legislation in the cases in hand. It is only the Petroleum Act and the directive issued by the Commissioner, civil Supplies pursuant to Clause 3(vii) of the Control Order which are relevant in the cases in hand and the said Control Order has been passed well in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act,1955, which is yet another Central legislation. Therefore, citing the above judgment and arguing as though the Central legislation and the State legislation are in conflict with each other so as to bring in the arguments of repugnancy or conflict are absolutely of no application to the context of the cases. Further more, the petitioners have neither seem to have challenged the cancellation order dated 13.12.2000 nor had the said orders been cancelled and therefore they have become final and holds good till date, much less on 5.12.2001 when the petitioners filed their renewal applications before the Licensing Authority, the 2nd respondent.

14. Moreover, the petitioners having committed fraud and cheating of the Government authority in seeking renewal of licences that were already cancelled and dead, does not have locus standi either to file the above writ petitions or to testify the validity of the law on the subject as they have done in the above writ petitions. Having failed to perpetrate their fraudulent acts with the Licensing Authority and the District Revenue Officer, Dharmapuri, now the petitioners have come up to play the same fraud on the High Court by means of the above writ petitions and hence the above writ petitions deserve only to be dismissed with exemplary costs. In result,

(i)Both the above writ petitions are not only absolutely devoid of merit but also an attempt to play fraud on the judicial process and therefore each of the above writ petitions is dismissed, at the admission stage itself, with an exemplary cost of Rs.10,000/= (Rupees Ten Thousand Only). (ii)The District Revenue Officer, Dharmapuri, the second respondent herein, is hereby directed to initiate prosecutions against the petitioners through the Civil Supplies C.I.D. Police, Dharmapuri District within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and report compliance to this Court. Consequently, W.P.M.P.Nos.32948 to 32950 of 2002 are also dismissed.

Index: Yes

Internet: Yes

Rao

9.07.2002.

To

1.The Special Commissioner and

Commissioner of Civil Supplies and

Consumer Protection, Chennai-600 005.

2.The Additional District Magistrate-cum-

The District Revenue Officer,

Dharmapuri.

3.The Tahsildar, Krishnagiri Taluk,

Dharmapuri District.

4.The Civil Supplies C.I.D.,

Dharmapuri District,

Dharmapuri.

V.KANAGARAJ, J.

Common Order in W.P.Nos.23971

and 23972/2002 and WPMPs.


Copyright

Reproduced in accordance with s52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court Websites

Advertisement

dwi Attorney | dui attorney | dwi | dui | austin attorney | san diego attorney | houston attorney | california attorney | washington attorney | minnesota attorney | dallas attorney | alaska attorney | los angeles attorney | dwi | dui | colorado attorney | new york attorney | new jersey attorney | san francisco attorney | seattle attorney | florida attorney | attorney | london lawyer | lawyer michigan | law firm |

Tip:
Double Click on any word for its dictionary meaning or to get reference material on it.