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M.MANICKAM versus SECRETARY AND COMMISSIONER

High Court of Madras

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M.Manickam v. Secretary and Commissioner - S.A.No.1064 of 2005 [2007] RD-TN 966 (15 March 2007)

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 15/03/2007

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.JAICHANDREN

S.A.No.1064 of 2005

and

C.M.P.No.2 of 2006

M.Manickam ... Appellant Vs.

1. Secretary and Commissioner,

Home Department,

Govt.of Tamilnadu,

Fort St.George,

Chennai-9.

2. The Secretary to Government,

Education Department,

Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

3. The Director of School Education,

Directorate of School Education,

College Road, Chennai-5

4. The Registrar High Court,

Chennai. ... Respondents The Second appeal has been filed against the Judgment and decree made in A.S.No.13 of 2004 on the file of the Sub-ordinate Court, Karur, dated 12.10.2004, reversing the Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.549 of 1995, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Karur, dated 09.10.2002. For appellant : Mr.N.V.Nagasubramaniam

for M/s.Srinath Sridevan

For respondents : Mr.N.Kannadasan

A.A.G for A.G.P (CS)

:ORDER



The Second appeal has been filed against the Judgment and decree made in A.S.No.13 of 2004, on the file of the Sub-ordinate Court, Karur, dated 12.10.2004, reversing the Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.549 of 1995, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Karur, dated 09.10.2002.

2.The appellant in the present second appeal was the plaintiff in the suit O.S.No.549 of 1995, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Karur. The plaintiff had filed the suit praying for a Decree and Judgment to declare the plaintiff's date of birth as 24.11.1950, and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 to 4 to carry out the correct date of birth of the plaintiff as 24.11.1950, in the place of the wrong date of birth of 19.03.1947, in the S.S.L.C. book and in the Service Records in the custody of the said defendants.

3. It has been stated by the plaintiff that he was originally a native of Udayampalayam, a village in Karur Taluk. His parents are Muthusamy Pandaram and Parvathiammal. The plaintiff's father Muthusamy Pandaram, the fifth defendant in the suit, is not an educated person. His profession was doing pooja in the village temple. The plaintiff's parents had six children and the plaintiff is the fourth among them. Certain details relating to the plaintiff's brothers and sisters were shown as follows:-

Sl.No

Name

Date of birth

Place of birth

1

Palaniammal

15.08.1939

Udayampalayam

2

M.Murugesan

.01.07.1942

Udayampalayam

3

Paripoornam

21.04.1945

Udayampalayam

4

M.Manickam

24.11.1950

Udayampalayam

5

M.Dhandapani

13.08.1953

Udayampalayam

6

Meenakshi

14.04.1956

Udayampalayam

4.The plaintiff had further stated that his parents had the horoscope of the children written in a note book, as and when they were born. Since the people in the villages had not known the importance or the legal necessity of reporting births and deaths to the authorities concerned the plaintiff's parents had not reported the birth of the plaintiff and that of the other children to the authorities. Thus, there was no Official Record relating to the date of birth of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had come across the horoscope note book, which contained the date's of birth, only in the month of October,1993. Only from the said note book, containing his horoscope, the plaintiff had come to know his date of birth as 24.11.1950.

5.The plaintiff had further submitted that he was educated in a village elementary school at Udayampalayam and then at S.S.V.High School at Kodumudi. He had his college education at Palani and at Madurai. At the time of his admission in school his father had given his date of birth, wrongly, as 19.03.1947, without verifying the horoscope note book. The wrong date of birth given by his father had been entered in all the school records, including the S.S.L.C. book, without any verification.

6. The plaintiff had also submitted that he had joined the State Subordinate Judicial Service as a District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, after he was duly selected for the said post by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. From 04.11.1988, he has been serving in the Judicial Department. In his Service Records, his date of birth has been entered as 19.03.1947, as found in the S.S.L.C. Book, whereas his actual date of birth is 24.11.1950. Due to the wrong date of birth given in the Service Records, the plaintiff has to retire from service 3 years, 8 months and 5 days before his actual date of superannuation. The plaintiff cannot be held responsible for the wrong and incorrect date of birth entered in the S.S.L.C. Book and in the Service Records. As soon as he came to know his real and correct date of birth from the horoscope note book and from his father, the fifth defendant in the suit, and from his elder brothers and sisters, he has been taking steps to correct the date of birth in the Service Records. Therefore, he had obtained the necessary permission from the High Court of Judicature at Madras, to approach the Courts of Law for appropriate relief. The date of birth had been corrected in the records in the concerned Taluk Office, through the process of Court, under The Registration of births and deaths Act,1969. The corrected Birth Certificate has been marked as plaintiff's document No.1. The plaintiff had issued notice to the defendants 1 to 4 to carry out the necessary corrections in the concerned records which were in their custody. Since they had not complied with the request, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for declaration and for mandatory injunction to have the wrong date of birth given in the S.S.L.C. book and in the Service Records, corrected as 24.11.1950.

7.In the written statement filed on behalf of the fourth defendant, namely, the High Court of Judicature at Madras, it has been stated that the plaintiff had been selected to the post of District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, (now known as Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Judicial Magistrate First Class) by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and appointed to the said post by the Government of Tamil Nadu. He had joined the Judicial Service as Judicial Magistrate, Villupuram, on 04.11.1988. The plaintiff while functioning as Judicial Magistrate No.1, Kuzhithurai, had submitted an application, dated 11.11.1993, to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, requesting for the passing of suitable orders to direct the concerned authorities to change his date of birth as 24.11.1950, instead of 19.03.1947, in his S.S.L.C. book and in the other records. After obtaining certain particulars from the plaintiff, he was informed that his date of birth in the S.S.L.C. book has to be corrected in accordance with law and only then his request for correcting the date of birth in the Service Records could be considered. It has been stated that Rule 30 of the then Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Rules, which was in existence at the time of the submission of the application by the plaintiff, reads as follows :- "Alteration of date of birth (a) If, at the time of his appointment to the service by direct recruitment, a candidate claims that his date of birth is different from that entered in his S.S.L.C or Matriculation Register or School Records, he shall make an application to Government through the High Court stating the evidence on which he relies and explaining how the mistake had occurred. The application shall be forwarded to the Board of Revenue for report after investigation by an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Collector and on receipt of the report, the Government shall decide whether the alternation of date of birth may be permitted or the application rejected. Provided that in the case of a candidate who was born out side State of Madras the investigation through the Board of Revenue shall be dispensed with and the Madras Public Service Commission or the appointing authority, as the case may be, shall examine and scrutinise the record that may be produced by the candidate and shall decide whether the alteration of date of birth may be permitted or the application may be rejected

b) After a person had entered the service by direct recruitment, an application to correct the date of his birth as entered in the official records shall normally be entertained only if such an application is made within five years of such entry into the service. Such an application shall be made to Government through the High Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-rule (a).

c) Any application received after five years after entry into service shall be summarily rejected.

d) In considering the question of permitting an alteration of date of birth as entered in official records even when such entry is proved to have been due to a bona fide mistake, the Government shall take into consideration the circumstances whether the applicant would have been normally eligible for appointment to the post at the time of entry into the service had his age been correctly stated and what would have been its effect on his service and service conditions of other officers in service and may permit the alteration subject to such conditions as they may deem fit to impose.

e) The procedure laid down in sub-rule (a) shall be followed in all cases where alteration of date of birth is proposed suo motu by the Head of Office on the basis of medical opinion in the absence of any other authoritative records. Explanation : For the purpose of this sub rule, Authoritative records are the secondary School Leaving Certificate or University College or School records.

(f) The decision of the Government shall be final. (g) The procedure prescribed in sub rules, (a) to (f) in the case of a candidate recruited direct to the service, shall apply to a candidate recruited by transfer, provided that his application is made within five years from the date of his first regular appointment to Government Service. Provided that in the case of a candidate who was born outside the State of Madras the investigation through the Board of Revenue shall be dispensed with and the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission or the appointing authority, as the case may be, shall examine and scrutinise the records that may be produced by the candidate and shall decide whether the alteration of date of birth may be permitted or the application may be rejected."

Since the plaintiff was appointed as a District Munsif-Cum -Judicial Magistrate under the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Rules by direct recruitment, he is governed by the said rules which is now called as the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules,1995, which had come into force in the year 1995. Since the government is the appointing authority, the date of birth of a Judicial Officer can be altered only by the government. Hence, as per the said rules, the prayer for directing the fourth defendant to correct the plaintiff's date of birth in the Service Records cannot be sustained. As per the said Rules, the government is the authority to decide the request of the officer, after following the procedures laid down in sub-rule (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 30 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Rules. The decision of the government in the said matter shall be final. Further, as per Rule 30(b) of the said rules, any application requesting for correction of date of birth, received within 5 years from the date of entry into service, could be entertained. The plaintiff, in the present case, had submitted his application to the High Court only on 11.11.1993, after the completion of five years from the date of his entry into service. Hence, as per Rule 30(c) of the said rules, his request for correcting his date of birth in his Service Records has to be summarily rejected. As per the new rules now in existence, namely, the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules, 1995, Rule 49, of the Tamil Nadu Sub-ordinate Service Rules is applicable to the Judicial officers, with effect from the date on which the new rules had come into existence. As per the Sub-ordinate Service Rules, the officer has to submit his application for correcting his date of birth in the Service Records within five years from the date of his entry into service. As per the said rules, the request of the officer has to be summarily rejected.

8.Based on the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties concerned, the trial court had framed the following issues for consideration :- "1) Whether it is correct to state that it is only the government that could change the date of birth ?

2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit? 3)What are the other reliefs available?"

In the said suit, four witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and exhibits 1 to 18 were marked on his behalf. No witness was examined on behalf of the defendants and no document was marked. Defendants 1 to 3 have been set ex parte and only the fourth defendant had entered appearance and contested the case.

9.It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he had joined the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service on 04.11.1988, and at the time of joining the service he had given 19.03.1947, as his date of birth to be entered in the Service Register. Later, when the plaintiff had come to know his correct date of birth as 24.11.1950, he had submitted a petition, dated 07.10.1993, to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, through the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Again, on 11.11.1993, the plaintiff had made a request for changing his date of birth through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari. Based on the request of the plaintiff, the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the fourth defendant in the suit, had sent a letter, dated 06.12.1993, and the plaintiff had submitted the required particulars to the said fourth defendant. Necessary permission had also been obtained from the High Court of Judicature at Madras, before the filing of the suit, for showing it as the fourth defendant in the said suit.

10. It has also been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that by medical examination his date of birth had been determined and the Medical Certificate had also been placed before the Court. It was the contention of the plaintiff that he had filed the required documents in Court and had also examined the necessary witnesses to prove that his correct date of birth is 24.11.1950 instead of 19.03.1947. Further, the plaintiff had also contended that he had submitted the required application to the fourth defendant, through the proper channel, on 07.10.1993, clearly conveying the intention to change the date of birth.

11. It has been submitted on behalf of the fourth defendant that the date of birth cannot be determined based on the notings in the horoscope. The plaintiff had entered in the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service, on 04.11.1988, and he ought to have requested for the change of date of birth within five years from the date of joining in the service. However, the plaintiff had submitted his application to the fourth defendant only on 11.11.1993, requesting to change his date of birth in the Service Register. The letter claimed to have been sent by the plaintiff, on 07.10.1993, cannot be taken to be an application or a petition for the change of date of birth. Hence, the request of the plaintiff is beyond the period of five years prescribed by law.

12.With regard to the first issue, the trial court had come to the conclusion that it is only the government that has the authority to change the date of birth in the S.S.L.C. book and in the Service Records and therefore, defendants 1 to 3 have been rightly added as parties to the suit. With regard to issues 2 and 3, the trial Court had held that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration as prayed for and consequently, defendants 1 to 3 were required to be directed to carry out the necessary corrections, with regard to the date of birth of the plaintiff. However, the trial Court had held that the prayer against the fourth defendant cannot be sustained. Two months time had been granted to the defendants 1 to 3 to comply with the Judgment and Decree granted by the trial Court.

13. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court, dated 09.10.2002, made in O.S.No.549 of 1995, the defendants 1 to 3 in the suit had filed the first appeal in A.S.No.13 of 2004, on the file of the Sub-Court, Karur. The first appellate Court had framed the following points for consideration:-

"1.Whether the plaintiff's application, dated 11.11.1993, is liable to be rejected?

2.Whether the plaintiff is eligible for the relief of declaration and mandatory injunction as prayed for?

3.What are the reliefs the appellant is entitled to?"

14.With regard to the first point, the first appellate Court, having read Exhibit A-2 filed on behalf of the plaintiff, has stated that it was a letter written by the plaintiff to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari, stating that he may be permitted to see the Service Records since he had intended to take steps to change his date of birth as 24.11.1950. The plaintiff had also requested the High Court to send a copy of the prescribed form in which the application has to be submitted. The first appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the letter which was said to have been sent by the plaintiff, on 07.10.1993, cannot be sustained either as a petition or as an application for the change of date of birth. The first appellate Court had also found that in the subsequent communications sent by the plaintiff to the High Court, it was only Exhibit A-3, dated 11.11.1993, which has been referred to and Exhibit A-2, dated 07.10.1993, had not been referred to by the plaintiff. It has also been found that even in the letter sent along with the application, dated 11.11.1993, the earlier letter, dated 07.10.1993, had not been referred to. Even in the communications sent by the plaintiff to the High Court which have been marked as Exhibits only the application of the plaintiff, dated 11.11.1993, has been mentioned. Therefore, the first appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff, for the first time, had made a request, dated 11.11.1993, to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari, marked as Exhibit A-3, with regard to the change of date of birth. If the said document is taken into account, then, the application made by the plaintiff is beyond the period of five years prescribed under Rule 30(b) of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Rules. Further, it was concluded that according to Rule 30(b), the plaintiff ought to have sent the application for change of date of birth to the government through the High Court of Judicature at Madras. Therefore, the plaintiff's application, dated 11.11.1993, being beyond the time limit prescribed by the rules, cannot be taken to be a valid application and it was liable to be summarily rejected, in accordance with Rule 30(c) of the said rules.

15.The first appellate Court had further held that the horoscope, marked as Exhibit A-17, cannot be taken as conclusive proof, regarding the age of the plaintiff. Further, Exhibit A-12, which is the Medical Certificate marked in favour of the plaintiff, the first appellate Court had held that it cannot be relied upon, since it has not been supported by clear evidence. The Medical Officer, who had been examined as a witness was not in a position to establish, clearly, the procedures followed in granting of the said Certificate by filing a detailed report. Exhibit A-1, which is the Birth Certificate of the plaintiff, was not relied upon by the first appellate Court as it could not be taken as conclusive proof of the actual date of birth. It had also been held that since the High Court of Judicature at Madras had not rejected the request of the plaintiff at the inception, it cannot be taken as though the High Court had accepted the request of the plaintiff. It was also found that the application had not been sent to the concerned authority, within the time limit prescribed in accordance with the relevant rules. Further, the other claims made by the plaintiff have not been accepted by the first appellate Court for want of credible evidence. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs as sought for by him. Hence, for the reasons stated above, the first appellate Court had allowed the first appeal A.S.No.13 of 2004, setting aside the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, made in O.S.No.549 of 1995, dated 09.10.2002. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree of the first appellate Court, dated 12.10.2004, made in A.S.No.13 of 2004, the present second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff/appellant on the various grounds stated therein.

16.The appellant had, interalia, raised the ground that the first appellate Court had erred in holding that Exhibit A-2 was not an application for seeking alteration of date of birth, merely because there was no mention about it in the subsequent communication sent to the fourth respondent, marked as Exhibit A-3. It had been further stated by the appellant that the first appellate Court had come to the wrong conclusion that Exhibit A-2 was not in the prescribed form and therefore, it could not be taken as a petition or an application for the change of date of birth. Exhibit A-2 was the first application, conveying the intention of the plaintiff to change his date of birth, which had been sent to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the fourth respondent, through the proper channel, namely, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari. The observation of the first appellate Court that the plaintiff / appellant had submitted his application at the fag end of his service is improper and unwarranted, since Exhibit A-2 had been made within five years from the date of the appellant entering into service. Further, it had also been contended that the first appellate Court had erred in not considering the other oral and documentary evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant, since the assertion of the plaintiff in the plaint that he was born on 24.11.1950, stands proved without having been rebutted under the Doctrine of Non-traverse.

17.The second appeal had been admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:

"a. Whether the Appellate Court, in an appeal against an ex parte decree, can disbelieve evidence which is unrebutted?

b. Whether the non-denial of the plaintiff's date of birth will not amount to admission on the principle of non-traverse?

c.Whether the appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court is in accordance with law?"

18.Heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as for the respondents.

19.The learned counsel, Mr.N.V.Nagasubramaniam, appearing on behalf of the appellant had contended that the plaintiff had submitted an application to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, through the proper channel, by his communication, dated 07.10.1993, marked as Exhibit A-2, conveying his intention to change his date of birth in the Service Records. Neither the existence of Exhibit A-2 nor its contents have been controverted by evidence during the trial of the suit O.S.No.549 of 1995. Therefore, the finding of the lower appellate Court, that there was no proof regarding the existence of A-2 and that it had really been sent to the fourth respondent, cannot be sustained, especially, in view of the fact that the trial Court had held in favour of the plaintiff. It has also to be noted that the defendants 1 to 3, having remained ex parte in the suit, had preferred the first appeal before the lower appellate Court, contesting the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. There was no examination of witnesses in favour of the defendants 1 to 3. No documents were marked and the said defendants had not cross-examined any of the witnesses who had deposed in favour of the plaintiff. During the deposition of the plaintiff's witnesses, there has been no suggestion that Exhibit A-12, dated 26.03.1999, showing the age of the appellant, was incorrect. Even in the written statement filed on behalf of the fourth defendant in the suit, there is no statement of defence controverting the date of birth of the plaintiff. Further, the fourth defendant had not controverted the claims of the plaintiff except stating that Exhibit A-3, dated 11.11.1993, is beyond the prescribed time limit. There is nothing shown on behalf of the fourth defendant that there is a specific form in which the application for change of date of birth should be submitted. If Exhibit A-3 can be taken to be an application for change of date of birth, Exhibit A-2, dated 07.10.1993, which is also in a similar form, can also be taken to be an application for the said purpose. Further, there is no pleading or evidence let in on behalf of the fourth defendant that the application had not been submitted in the correct form. In such circumstances, the first appellate Court ought not to have reversed the findings of the trial Court.

20. The learned Additional Advocate General Mr.N.Kannadasan, appearing on behalf of the respondents, had contended that if Exhibit A-3, dated 11.11.1993, is taken to be the petition/application for change of date of birth of the appellant, then, the petition/application is clearly beyond the time prescribed by the relevant service Rules applicable to the appellant. However, if Exhibit A-2, dated 7.10.1993, is taken to be the first communication from the appellant conveying his intention to change the date of birth, the said communication is within the time limit prescribed by the Rules. Both the Exhibits A-2, dated 7.10.1993 and A-3, dated 11.11.1993, are in a letter form. Though the Rules applicable to the appellant do not provide any particular form or content for a petition or an application to be made under the Rules for change of date of birth, the petition or application should convey a clear intention of the applicant to change his date of birth. The time limit has been prescribed by the Rules in order to prevent persons making a request for change of date of birth at the fag end of his or her career or service. Further, Exhibit A-12, dated 26.3.1999, which is the Medical Certificate marked in favour of the appellant, cannot be taken to be conclusive proof of his age.

21.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had relied on the following decisions to support his contentions:-

21.1.In Conrad Dias of Bombay Vs. Joseph Dias of Bombay, reported in AIR 1995 Bombay 210, the High Court of Bombay had held that a party cannot take up a new plea or a new contention in an appeal unless he had pleaded the same in the written statement.

21.2.In Pyrites Phosphates and Chemicals Ltd., Vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1998 Patna 57, it was held that the respondents therein cannot be allowed to frustrate the process of the Court by adopting the easy option of not appearing despite valid service of notice, and therefore, applying the Doctrine of Non-traverse, it must be held that the respondents accept the claims raised against them.

21.3. In Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs., Vs Bishun Narain Inter College and others, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1242, it has been held as follows :-

" It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parities cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that inspite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal."

21.4.In Dalim Kumar Sain and others Vs. Smt.Nandarani Dassi and another, reported in AIR 1970 Calcutta 292, it was held that the certified copy of the Birth Certificate duly signed is automatic evidence as public document under the conjoint effect of Sections 35 and 77 of the Evidence Act,1872. The evidence is conclusive unless disproved.

22.Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:- 22.1.In State of Gujarat and others Vs. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 537, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "Before any direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be within at least a reasonable time. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth in his service book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy on the part of such public servants to approach the court or the tribunal on the eve of their retirement, questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of their dates of birth in the service books. By this process, it has come to the notice of the Supreme Court that in many cases, even if ultimately their applications are dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for months, after the date of superannuation. The Court or the tribunal must, therefore, be slow in granting an interim relief or continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and thereby caused injustice to his immediate junior."

22.2.In State of Orissa and Others Vs. Bra`hamarbar Senapathi, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 491, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "2. This appeal arises against the order of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in OA No. 858 of 1989 dated June 22, 1992. The respondent joined the service as a Cook in CDMO Cuttack on February 9, 1962. Thereafter he was promoted as Disinfector and Senior Helper. He attained the age of superannuation on May 31, 1989. Before his retirement when the notice of retirement was given, he filed an application on April 24, 1989 stating that his correct date of birth is June 27, 1934 and therefore he cannot be retired. Since his representation was not accepted, he filed OA No. 858 of 1989 before the tribunal. The tribunal observed that his correct date of birth is June 27, 1934 and not May 18, 1929 as entered in the service register and therefore the respondent is entitled to be in service till the age of 60 years. Thus this appeal by special leave.

3. Rule 65 of the Orissa General Financial Rules provides thus : "Every person on entering government service shall declare his/her date of birth which shall not differ from any such declaration expressed or implied for any public purpose before entering service. The date of birth shall be supported by documentary evidence such as Matriculation Certificate, Municipal Birth Certificate and entered in his/her service record. No alteration of the date of birth of Government servant shall be made except in case of clerical error without prior approval of the State Government. An application for effecting a change in the date of birth shall be summarily rejected if: ( a ) filed after five years of entry into government service, ( b ) the change would so lower the applicant's age that he/she would have been ineligible to appear in any of the academic or recruitment examinations in which he/she had appeared or for consideration for appointment to any service or post under the Government."

4. A reading of these rules clearly shows that every person on entering government service shall declare his/her date of birth which shall not differ from any such declaration expressed or implied for any public purpose before entering service. The date of birth shall be supported by documentary evidence such as Matriculation Certificate, Municipal Birth Certificate and entered in his/her service record. No alteration of the date of birth of government servant shall be made except in case of clerical error without prior approval of the State Government. An application for effecting a change in the date of birth shall be summarily rejected if filed after five years of entry into government service, etc. From what has been stated in paragraph 7 of the order of the tribunal, it would appear that the respondent became aware of the entry in the service register in the year 1970. Admittedly, no action has been taken within five years thereafter. Under those circumstances, Rule 65 as referred to above is clear that his claim for alteration shall be summarily rejected without any further inquiry. Now the respondent sought to place reliance on School Certificate in which the date of birth was entered as June 27, 1934. Obviously, he must have had the knowledge of the School Certificate but he failed to produce it when he entered into the service or had knowledge of the entry made in the service register as May 18, 1929 as early as 1970. Under these circumstances, the tribunal committed a manifest error in correcting the date of birth. Rule 65 is mandatory and the tribunal had not given due consideration to it. The appeal is allowed."

22.3.In Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 162, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

" The application for correction of date of birth, entered in the service-book in 1956, for the first time made in September, 1991, was hopelessly belated. It had not been made even within the period of five years from the date of coming into force of Note 5 to FR 56(m) in 1979. His inaction for all this period of about thirty-five years from the date of joining service, therefore precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of birth in service record was not correct. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth.

It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of laches, or stale claims, is generally applied by the courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time limit, in the service rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government Servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation even it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age. A public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he cannot claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth claimed by him.

Though note 5 to FR 56(m) was incorporated only in 1979 and it provides for request to be made for correction of date of birth within five years from the date of entry into service but the intention of the rule-making authority in providing the period of limitation for seeking the correction of the date of birth of the Government servant has to be examined which is to discourage stale claims and belated applications for alternation of date of birth recorded in the service-book at the time of initial entry. It is the duty of the courts and tribunals to promote that intention by an intelligible and harmonious interpretation of the rule rather than choke its operation. The interpretation has to be the one which advances the intention and not the one which frustrates it. It could not be the intention of the rule-making authority to give unlimited time to seek correction of date of birth, after 1979, to those Government servants who had joined the service prior to 1979 but restrict it to the five year period for those who enter service after 1979. If a Government servant, already in service for a long time, had applied for correction of date of birth before 1979, it would not be permissible to non-suit him on the ground that he had not applied for correction within five years of his entry into service, but the case of Government servant who applied for correction of date of birth only after 1979 stands on a different footing. It would be appropriate and in tune with harmonious construction of the provision to hold that in the case of those Government servant who were already in service before 1979, for a period of more than five years, who intended to have their date of birth corrected after 1979, may seek the correction of date of birth within a reasonable time after 1979 but in any event not later than five years after the coming into force of the amendment in 1979. This view would be in consonance with the intention of the rule-making authority."

22.4. In State of U.P. and others Vs. Gulaichi (Smt), reported in (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 483, it has been held as follows :- "The respondent joined service under the State on 06.07.1959. In the service book her date of birth was recorded to be 31-7-1929. Consequently, she was to retire on 31-7-1987. About three weeks before the date of retirement i.e.on 7- 7-1987. she approached the Chief Medical Officer claiming her date of birth to be 31.07.1939. The official concerned made the correction in her service-book. On that basis, a suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff for a declaration that her date of birth is 31-7-1939, but by mistake of an officer/employee of the Department, it was wrongly recorded as 31-7-1929. The suit was dismissed but first appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed by Addl.Distt.Judge declaring the date of birth of the plaintiff to be 31-7-1939 and that she was entitled to all service benefits on that basis. In the second appeal the High Court declined to interfere.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court had held that normally, in public service, with entering into the service, even the date of exit, which is said to be the date of superannuation or retirement, is also fixed. That is why the date of birth is recorded in the relevant register or service-book, relating to the individual concerned. This is the practice prevalent in all services, because every service having fixed the age of retirement, it is necessary to maintain the date of birth in the service records. Most of the States have framed statutory rules or in absence thereof issued administrative instructions as to how a claim made by a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth in the service record is to be dealt with and what procedure is to be followed. In many such rules a period has been prescribed within which if any public servant makes any grievance in respect of error in the recording of his date of birth, the application for that purpose can be entertained. The sole object of such rules being that any such claim regarding correction of date of birth should not be made or entertained after decades, especially on the eve of superannuation of such public servant. Of late a trend can be noticed, that many public servants, on the eve of their retirement raise a dispute about their records, by either invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or by filing applications before the Administrative Tribunals concerned, or even filing suits for adjudication as to whether the dates of birth recorded were correct or not. An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the courts, Tribunals or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. Any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury. This is certainly an important and relevant aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the Court or the Tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of the date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be within at least a reasonable time.

The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service-book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy on the part of such public servants to approach the Court or the Tribunal on the eve of their retirement, questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of their date of birth in the service-books. By this process, it has come to the notice of the Supreme Court that in many cases, even if ultimately their applications are dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for months, after the date of superannuation. The Court or the Tribunal must, therefore, be slow in granting an interim relief or continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and thereby caused injustice to his immediate junior.

In the instant case U.P.Recruitment of Service (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 and the U.P.Recruitment of Service (Determination of Date of Birth) (First Amendment) Rules, 1980 clearly indicate the permissible area for correction of the date of birth. In view of the specific provisions made, it was not permissible to effect any change. Additionally, the person who endorsed changes was not authorized to do so. The original service-book was produced before the Supreme Court. The entry i.e.31-7-1929 appears to have been made simultaneously by one and the same person at the time when other entries were made in FR Form 13. The respondent has herself signed the page at Serial No.8, whereas the entry relating to the date of birth is at Serial No.5. Having regard to the facts of the case, it must be held that the First Appellate Court and the High Court were not justified in their conclusions to the effect that the date of birth of the respondent was 31-7-1939. The trial Court was correct in its analysis by holding that the date of birth is 31-7-1929. Therefore, order of the High Court is set aside. The date of birth of the respondent has to be taken for all purposes to be 31-7-1929 and not 31-7-1939 as claimed by her.

Usually, no interference is called for when findings of fact are recorded by the trial/appellate courts and the High Court, more so, when the issue is decided in second appeal. But where the courts below lose sight of statutory provisions or act on irrelevant or inadmissible materials, and ignore relevant materials, interference is not impermissible."

22.5.In State of Punjab and others Vs. S.C.Chadha, reported in (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 394, it has been held as follows:- "An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the courts, tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. Unless a clear case on the basis of clinching materials, which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the employee and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the Court or the tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of the date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be filed within at least a reasonable time. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth.

Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service-book. Moreover the Court or the tribunal must be slow in granting an interim relief or continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and thereby caused injustice to his immediate junior." 22.6.In State of T.N. Vs. T.V.Venugopalan, reported in (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 302, it has been held as follows :-

"The respondent entered service on 12-1-1952. On 14-8-1990, i.e.an year before the date of superannuation he made an application for correction of his recorded date of birth from 15-8-1933 to 15-8-1935, which was rejected by the Government. The Administrative Tribunal granted him relief. In the instant appeal filed by the Government against the Tribunal's decision, the respondent contended that Rule 49 of the T.N.State and Subordinate Services having been prospectively introduced in 1961 prescribing a limitation of five years for seeking correction of the date of birth after entering service, he had no prior opportunity to have his recorded date of birth corrected. Rejecting this contention and allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 49 is to be harmoniously interpreted. The application for correction of the date of birth of an in-service employee should be made within five years from the date when the Rules had come into force, i.e.,1961. If no application is made, after expiry of five years, the government employee loses his right to make an application for correction of his date of birth. It is seen that the respondent entered into the service on 12-1-1952, and only when he was due for superannuation at the age of 58 years on 31-8-1991, he made the application exactly one year before his superannuation. The Government rejected his claim before he attained the age of superannuation on 30-8-1991. When challenged, the Tribunal, for incorrect reasons; set aside the order and remitted the matter for reconsideration. The Government considered various facts and circumstances in the GOMs No.271 and rejected the claim on 31-3-1993. The evidence is neither unimpeachable nor irrefutable. The Tribunal in its judicial review is not justified in trenching into the field of appreciation of evidence and circumstances in its evaluation to reach a conclusions on merits as it is not a Court of appeal.

The Supreme Court has, repeatedly, been holding that inordinate delay in making the application is itself a ground for rejecting the correction of the date of birth. The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register.

.........

It is common phenomenon that just before superannuation, an application would be made to the Tribunal or Court just to gain time to continue in service and the Tribunal or courts are unfortunately unduly liberal in entertaining and allowing the government employees or public employees to remain in office, which is adding an impetus to resort to the fabrication of the record and place reliance thereon and seek the authority to correct it. When rejected, on grounds of technicalities, question them and remain in office till the period claimed for, gets expired. This case is one such stark instance the Tribunal has grossly erred in showing over-indulgence in granting the reliefs even trenching beyond its powers of allowing him to remain in office for two years after his date of superannuation even as per his own case and given all conceivable directions beneficial to the employee. It is, therefore, a case of the grossest error of law committed by the Tribunal which cannot be countenanced and cannot be sustained on any ground. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs quantified as Rs.3000."

23.It was reiterated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the Second Appeal that the finding of the lower appellate Court, that there was no proof shown on behalf of the appellant that he had sent the communication, marked as Exhibit A-2, to High Court of Judicature at Madras, is incorrect as it is not the case of the fourth respondent that such a communication had not been sent by the appellant. Further, there was neither any oral evidence nor any documentary evidence, placed before the Courts below on behalf of the fourth respondent, to controvert the claims made by the appellant. According to the Doctrine of Non-traverse, the claims of the appellant remained proved and it is not open to the respondents to challenge it at this stage. Further, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had also contended that there was no specific form in which an application ought to have been made to request for change of date of birth. Therefore, it would be sufficient for a person to convey his intention to change the date of birth, within the time limit of five years prescribed by the relevant rules. In such view of the matter, Exhibit A-2 , dated 07.10.1993, ought to be taken as the application conveying the intention of the appellant to have his date of birth changed in the S.S.L.C. book and in the other Service Records. If Exhibit A-3, dated 11.11.1993, could be taken to be an application conveying the intention of the appellant to change his date of birth, then it cannot be said that Exhibit A-2, dated 07.10.1993, is not an application or a communication conveying the intention of the appellant relating to his change of date of birth. It is also not open to the respondents 1 to 3 to contest the claims of the appellant regarding the facts of the case, since they had remained ex parte at the earlier stage. It is only a question of law that they could raise at the present stage. Further, the fourth respondent had not specifically refused the request of the appellant except stating that the change of date of birth in the Service Records could be done only after altering the S.S.L.C.book of the appellant.

24.According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the word "application" would mean the action of applying by a petition or a request for an action or relief or making a formal request for something to be done. The prayer or request could be oral or in a written form. Therefore, the communication of the appellant, dated 07.10.1993, marked as Exhibit A-2, ought to be considered as the application made by the appellant to the concerned authority to change his date of birth. It has also been contended on behalf of the appellant in the present Second Appeal that the cases cited on behalf of the respondents are relating to applications or requests made by the concerned persons very late in their career or service and therefore, they will not be applicable to the present case on facts. Rule 30(b) of The Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules, 1995, states that after a person had entered into the service by direct recruitment, an application to correct the date of his birth as entered in the Official Records shall normally be entertained only if such an application is made within five years of such entry into the service. This could only mean that normally, the application could be made within five years of entry into service. However, it would also mean that in certain extraordinary circumstances the application could be permitted even beyond the prescribed period of limitation. While so, when the appellant had sent his communication, dated 07.10.1993, to the fourth respondent, through the proper channel, it could not be said that it was beyond the time limit prescribed by the rules. It was also stated that the lower appellate Court had committed a serious mistake in disbelieving the appellant when he had stated that he was born after a gap of five years whereas all the other siblings were born at an interval of three years each. The lower appellate Court had also committed an error in disbelieving the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant with regard to his actual date of birth. Even though a Medical Certificate, dated 26.03.1999, was marked as Exhibit A-12, showing the approximate age of the appellant, the lower appellate Court had not shown credence in the same. Even the other exhibits marked in favour of the appellant, including the voter's list, were not considered by the lower appellate Court before coming to the conclusion that the prayer of the appellant cannot be sustained.

25.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3, had relied on the decisions of the various Courts of law in contending that an application made beyond the prescribed period, as provided under the relevant rules, cannot be entertained. However, it is seen that the cases cited by the learned counsel were mostly relating to requests being made for change of date of birth at a late stage in the service of the applicants. There is nothing placed before this Court to show that there is a prescribed form in which an application for change of date of birth ought to be made by an applicant. It was also not shown as to the contents of such an application or the way in which the request for change of date of birth is to be conveyed. If the fourth respondent had communicated the intention of the appellant to the concerned department of the State Government well within time or even if the fourth respondent had replied to the appellant sufficiently in time, after receiving his communication, dated 07.10.1993, the position could have been different and the delay could have been avoided. Even though the trial Court had found the claims made by the petitioner to be true and correct, the lower appellate Court had come to a different conclusion without appreciating the facts of the case and the law applicable in such circumstances.

26. Based on the rival contentions the points that arise for consideration in the present second appeal are as follows :-

"1) Whether the plaintiff / appellant had made the application for change of date of birth within time?

2) Whether the letter Exhibit A-2, dated 07.10.1993, submitted by the plaintiff / appellant could be taken to be a petition / application for change of date of birth?

3) Whether the respondents 1 to 3 could be permitted to controvert the evidence which are in favour of the plaintiff / appellant, at the stage of the second appeal when they had remained ex parte at the earlier stage? 4) Whether it is the government that has to change the date of birth of the plaintiff / appellant in the S.S.L.C. book and in his Service Records? 5) Any other relief the plaintiff / appellant is entitled to?"

27.With regard to the first point that has arisen for consideration, it is found that the trial Court had come to the conclusion that Exhibit A-2, marked in support of the contentions raised by the plaintiff in the suit and the appellant in the present Second Appeal is dated 07.10.1993. With regard to the said document, it was contended on behalf of the appellant herein that the request was sent to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the fourth respondent herein, through the proper channel i.e. the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari, with regard to the change of date of birth of the appellant in his Service Records. The said communication sent by the appellant is found to be within the time limit of five years prescribed by the Service Rules applicable to him. Rule 30(b) of the Tamil Nadu Judicial Service Rules makes it clear that the application shall be made by a person for change of date of birth within five years from the date of entry into service. The communication Exhibit A-2 , dated 07.10.1993, sent by the appellant was within the prescribed time limit. With regard to the said issue the first appellate court had found that since there was no reference to the said communication, dated 07.10.1993, in his subsequent communications to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, it could not be held that the appellant had actually sent the communication, dated 07.10.1993. However, from the available records, it is seen that the fourth defendant in the suit, who is also the fourth respondent in the present second appeal had not denied the receipt of the communication from the appellant, dated 07.10.1993. The respondents 1 to 3 herein were the defendants 1 to 3 in the suit and they had remained ex parte at the trial stage of the said suit. Further, it is not the case of the respondents in the present second appeal that there is a specific form prescribed by the rules in which an application may be made for change of date of birth. It is also not the case of the respondents that the application ought to have been made only to the government for such a change of date of birth. In such circumstances, there is nothing shown on the part of the respondents to disbelieve the claim of the appellant that he had sent a communication to the fourth respondent, dated 07.10.1993, marked as Exhibit A-2, conveying his intention to change his date of birth in his Service Records. In view of the fact that there is no specific form in which an application should be made for change of date of birth, Exhibit A-2 could be taken to be the first petition / application made with regard to change of date of birth of the appellant. With regard to the first two points arising for consideration, it could be stated that the petition / application Exhibit A-2, dated 07.10.1993, submitted by the appellant could be taken to be in accordance with the rules and therefore, it is within the time limit prescribed.

28.With regard to the third point arising for consideration, applying the Doctrine of Non-traverse, the defendants 1 to 3, having remained ex parte at the trial stage, cannot be permitted to raise the plea to controvert the claim of the appellant with regard to the said document, dated 07.10.1993, marked as Exhibit A-2, especially, when no witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendants and no documents were filed. With regard to the fourth point for consideration as to whether the government alone had the authority to change the date of birth of the appellant, the findings and the view taken by the Trial Court could be said to be correct. Therefore, it is held that the government is the appropriate authority to change the date of birth of the appellant in his Service Records.

29.In view of the rival contentions put forth on behalf of the parties concerned and based on the records available before this Court, it is seen that the plaintiff in the suit and the appellant in the present Second Appeal has sent a communication, dated 7.10.1993, to the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the fourth respondent herein, conveying his intention to change his date of birth in the S.S.L.C. Book and in his Service Records. Though the said communication has not been referred to in the subsequent correspondence between the Appellant and the fourth respondent, there is nothing shown on the part of the respondents denying the receipt of such a communication, dated 7.10.1993. Moreover, the respondents have not contended that there is a specific form, provided by the relevant rules, in which the intention of the appellant ought to have been conveyed.

30.In such circumstances, the communication, dated 7.10.1993, is to be taken as the request of the appellant for change of date of birth as it is within the time limit prescribed by the service rules applicable to the appellant. In view of the substantial questions of law framed by the appellant, it would not be open to the respondents, who had remained ex parte before the trial Court, to contest the factual claims of the appellant. According to the Doctrine of Non-traverse as held in Pyrites Phosphates and Chemicals Ltd., Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 Pat 57, one cannot be allowed to frustrate the process of the Court by adopting the easy option of not appearing despite valid service of notice. On the basis of Doctrine Non-traverse i.e.acceptance by non-denial, it was held that the claim of the petitioner is not denied but accepted by the respondents. Therefore, the non-denial of the claims of the appellant would amount to their admission by the respondents concerned, especially, when the evidence let in on behalf of the appellant remained unrebutted.

31.In such view of the matter and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that the lower appellate Court has travelled beyond the norms prescribed for proper appreciation of evidence in reversing the findings of the trial Court in O.S.No.549 of 1995.

32.Accepting the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, the judgment and decree of the Sub-ordinate Court, Karur, dated 12.10.2004, made in A.S.No.13 of 2004, is set aside and consequently, the judgment and decree of the District Munsif Court, Karur, dated 9.10.2002, made in O.S.No.549 of 1995, stands restored. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed. The connected C.M.P. is closed. No costs.

To

1. Secretary and Commissioner,

Home Department,

Govt.of Tamilnadu,

Fort St.George,

Chennai-9.

2. The Secretary to Government,

Education Department,

Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

3. The Director of School Education,

Directorate of School Education,

College Road, Chennai-5

4. The Registrar High Court,

Chennai.




Copyright

Reproduced in accordance with s52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court Websites

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