Over 2 lakh Indian cases. Search powered by Google!

Case Details

D.SINGH versus D.J.

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Case Law Search

Indian Supreme Court Cases / Judgements / Legislation

Judgement


D.Singh v. D.J. - WRIT - C No. 15709 of 1994 [2004] RD-AH 1602 (3 December 2004)

 

This is an UNCERTIFIED copy for information/reference. For authentic copy please refer to certified copy only. In case of any mistake, please bring it to the notice of Joint Registrar(Copying).

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ALLAHABAD

Reserved

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15709 of 1994

Dhyan Singh and others ...Petitioners

Versus

District Judge and others ...Respondents

****

Hon'ble A.P. Sahi,J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi,J.)

The petitioners have come up assailing the orders of the courts below dated 13.12.1993 passed by the learned District Judge, Mainpuri and orders dated 21.7.1993 and 16.4.1993 passed by the learned Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri whereby the application of the respondent no. 3 for extension of time to deposit the decretal amount in respect of a pre-emption decree has been allowed and the same has been upheld by the learned revisional court.

The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The respondent no. 3 filed a suit against the petitioners for specific performance on the basis of an agreement to sell the suit property. The respondent no. 3 had executed a sale deed on 25.6.1984 in respect of plot no. 218 area 1 acre 10 decimals in favour of the petitioners for a consideration of Rs.20,000/-. The said sale deed, which has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, contained recital to the effect that in case a sum of Rs.20,000/- is returned back within a period of six  years the same would be acceptable  to the petitioners and the land would be reconveyed to the respondent no. 3 by the petitioners.

The respondent no. 3, it appears, wanted the land to be reconveyed back to him for which purpose  he instituted  Original Suit No.  461 of 1991 for specific performance in his favour. The suit was decreed on 16.4.1993 and orders were passed directing the petitioners (defendants in the suit) to execute the sale deed in favour of respondent no. 3 Sauji Ram (plaintiff). The learned trial court while decreeing the suit has also recorded that one of the defendant witness D.W.1 had deposed before the court that the defendants were prepared to reconvey the property provided the entire consideration money together with costs of the proceeding is paid to them. It was also directed that a sum of Rs.20,000/- would be paid by the respondent no. 3 to the petitioners along with 6 % interest with effect from  25.6.1984 and  time upto 31.5.1993 was granted by the learned trial court for depositing of the said amount.

From the record it appears that respondent no. 3 (plaintiff) moved an application on 21.5.1993 for extension of time on account of ailment in order to enable him to deposit the decretal amount upon which the learned Munsif Magistrate granted four days time subject to payment of Rs.100/- as costs. However, it appears that the amount was not deposited with regard to which an explanation was afforded by the respondent no. 3 before the learned trial court that he could not make the deposit as he was incorrectly advised by his lawyer that since the civil court is closed for summer vacation in June hence money will be deposited on the reopening of the civil court on July 1, 1993. Thus, the money was not deposited upto the month of June and an application was moved on 6.7.1993 for further extension of time on the ground of ailment of the plaintiff wherein he alleged that he had fallen ill and was in hospital from 1.7.1993 to 3.7.1993.The said application dated 6.7.1993 for further extension of time was allowed on 21.7.1993 and time was granted upto 22.7.1993 to deposit the entire amount which was allowed on payment of Rs.200/- as costs. It is further borne out from the recital in the revisional court's order that the plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 32,457/- being the entire decretal amount along with the interest and the costs imposed before the learned trial court. The facts narrated herein above would indicate that the deposit was not made within the time as fixed originally under the decree and subsequent extensions were also sought which was granted by the learned trial court. The default for deposit was in respect of the entire decretal amount.

From a perusal of the order dated 21.7.1993 it is clear that the application was allowed in the plaintiff's case was accepted and the delay in depositing the amount was condoned. The grounds of acceptance by the learned trial court were two fold; firstly, the plaintiff had been incorrectly advised by his lawyer in the civil court about the closure of the court in the month of June and, secondly, the plaintiff was genuinely suffering from ailment and since both these  situations were beyond his control, therefore, the principles of natural justice demanded that he be extended  the benefit of extension  of time  in order to prevent any miscarriage of justice. It was further held by the learned trial court that the plaintiff cannot be penalized in a situation like this and correspondingly the defendant can be adequately compensated. The application was, therefore, allowed on payment of Rs.300/- as costs.

The petitioners preferred a revision before the learned District Judge and urged that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Kumari Sushila Devi Versus Mohammad Shafi reported in 1982 AWC 218, the learned trial court had no jurisdiction to enlarge and extend the time of deposit being made by the plaintiff in terms of the decree. Relying on the said decision it was urged that section 148 C.P.C. cannot be  pressed into service in extending time  in respect of the conditional decree. The revisional court dismissed the revision holding that the judgment in the case of  Kumari Sushila Devi (supra) was no longer  good law in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to in the order of the revisional court.

The revisional court has relied upon a judgment  of the Apex Court reported in (1978) 2 SCC 116(Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Versus  Sudha Rani Devi and others. In the said decision one of the issues raised was as to whether on failure to deposit the decretal amount the same would result in the dismissal of the suit. The question of extension of time  was also involved therein and the Court upheld the orders granting extension of time in the said case. However, the said decision has not discussed the principles of the application of Section 148 C.P.C. in the case of pre-emption decree as presently involved.

The next judgment relied upon by the learned revisional court is in the case of Ganesh Prasad Kesri and another Versus Laxmi Narain reported in  (1985) 3 SCC 53, wherein general principles of the applicability as regards to section 148 C.P.C. were laid down as under:

"10.This construction also commends to us for the additional reason that where the court fixes a time to do a thing, the court always retains the powers to extend the time for doing so. Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. The Principle of this section must govern in not whittling down the discretion conferred on the court."

The revisional court rested its conclusion ultimately by relying upon the decision in the case of  Johri Singh Versus Sukhpal Singh and others reported in (1989) 4 SCC 403.  This case extensively deals with the power of the court to extend the time in respect of the decree in pre-emption suit as contemplated under Order 20 Rule 14 C.P.C. At this juncture it would be appropriate to quote Order 20 Rules 12-A and 14 C.P.C.

"Rule 12-A- Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property- Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property orders that the purchase-money or other sum be paid to the purchaser or lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made.

" Rule 14-Decree in pre-emption suit- (1) Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall: -

(a) specify a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be so paid: and

(b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs ( if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have  accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not  so paid, the suit shall be deemed with costs.

(2)Where the Court has adjudicated upon rival

claims to pre-emption. The decree shall direct: -

(a) if an in so far as the  claim decreed are equal in degree, that the  claim of each  pre-emption complying with the  provisions of  sub-rule (1) shall take  effect in respect of a  proportionate share of the  property including any proportionate share in respect of  which the claim of any pre-emption failing to comply with the said provisions would, but for such default, have taken effect; and

(b) if and in so far as the claims decreed are different  in degree, that the claim of the  inferior pre-emption shall not take effect unless and until the superior pre-emption has failed to comply with the said  provisions.

The Apex Court in the case of Johri Singh (supra) has specified and distinguished the various categories of cases to indicate the circumstances in which the court would be justified in granting extension of time. Paragraphs 17 to 20 of the said decision are extracted below:

"17.Section 148 deals with enlargement of time                    and provides:

"Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."

18.This section empowers the court to extend the time fixed by it even after the expiry of the period originally fixed. It by implication allows the court to enlarge the time before the time originally fixed.  The use of the word '' may' shows that the power is discretionary and the court is, therefore, entitled to take into account the conduct of the party praying for such extension.

19.From the above decision one could distinguish the cases of non-deposit of the whole of the purchase money within the fixed time where there was no stay order granted by the appellate court from the cases of non-deposit of the decretal amount consequent upon a stay order granted by the appellate court. In the first category of above cases the provision of Order  XX Rule 14(1) would be strictly applicable, the provision being mandatory as was held in Naguba case. In the second category of above cases, it would be necessary to examine the nature and effect of the stay order on the deemed deposit of the suit and also to see whether a fresh period is fixed thereby as were the cases in Datteraya and Jogdhayan.

20.In the third category of cases, namely, non-deposit of only a relatively small fraction of the purchase money due to inadvertent mistake whether or not caused by any action of the court, the court has the discretion under section 148 CPC to extend and time even though the time fixed has already expired provided it is satisfied that the mistake is bona fide and was not indicative of negligence or inaction as was the case in Jogdhayan. The court will extend the time when it finds that the mistake was the result of, or induced by, an action of the court applying the  maxim ''actus curiae  neminem gravabit'- an act of the court shall prejudice no man, as was the case  in Jang Singh. While it would be necessary to consider the facts of the case to determine whether the inadvertent mistake was due to any action of the court it would be appropriate to find that the ultimate permission to deposit the challaned amount is that of the court."

Another decision which deserves to be quoted in this regard is the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Govardhan Singh Versus Barsati reported in  1972, ALJ, 169 paragraph 7. The Full Bench was also called upon to answer this very issue as to whether the court had power to extend the time even when the application for extension of time was made after the expiry of the time fixed by the court. The Full Bench answered the question in the following terms: -

" In our opinion, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad is no longer good law. Even in cases where an order is made by the Court for doing a thing within a  particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the Court  has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under section 148 C.P.C. to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction."

A perusal of the facts of the present case discloses that the witness who had deposed  as D.W. 1  on behalf of the defendant had clearly stated that the defendants were  agreed to reconvey the property provided the entire amount of consideration together with the interest and costs incurred by the defendant are paid back to them. The conduct of the defendant-petitioner before the trial court and as recorded in the judgment and decree dated 16.4.1993 clearly explains that the defendant-petitioners were prepared to reconvey the property provided they were favoured with the payment prayed for by them. Apart from this, the trial court has recorded reasons which, in my opinion, are cogent reasons for allowing the application for extension of time treating the conduct of the plaintiff-applicant to be bonafide and genuine. The trial court has rightly believed  the plaintiff's version that the plaintiff was prevented on account of situation beyond his control in making the deposit as per the judgment dated 16.4.1993. In revision, the said discretion exercised by the trial court was upheld. Thus, the discretion exercised by the trial court and as affirmed by the revisional court cannot be said to be infirm on any ground. From the decisions cited at Bar and the decision of the Full Bench referred to herein above it is clear that the trial court was empowered to extend the time exercising jurisdiction under section 148 C.P.C. Even, otherwise, I am of the opinion, that substantial justice has been done between the parties and as such it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Before parting with the case it would not be out of place to mention that the legislature amended the provisions of Section 148 I.P.C. by Act No. 46 of 1999, which has come into effect from 1.7.2002. The amended section 148 I.P.C. now restricts the power of the court to extend time upto 30 days in total. Thus, under the amended section the power to grant extension has been preserved to the outer limit of 30 days only. The amended section 148 I.P.C. is quoted herein below: -

"148.Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding thirty days in total), even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."

However, the aforesaid amended provisio0n is no

Relevant for the present controversy inasmuch as in this case the order was passed in the year 1999 whereas the mended provision has come into effect only in July 2002.

From what has been stated herein above, this Court is clearly of the view that the instant writ petition is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed.  There shall be no orders as to cost.

D/-

Mahmood.

Reserved

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15709 of 1994

Dhyan Singh and others ...Petitioners

Versus

District Judge and others ...Respondents

****

Hon'ble A.P. Sahi,J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi,J.)

The petitioners have come up assailing the orders of the courts below dated 13.12.1993 passed by the learned District Judge, Mainpuri and orders dated 21.7.1993 and 16.4.1993 passed by the learned Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri whereby the application of the respondent no. 3 for extension of time to deposit the decretal amount in respect of a pre-emption decree has been allowed and the same has been upheld by the learned revisional court.

The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The respondent no. 3 filed a suit against the petitioners for specific performance on the basis of an agreement to sell the suit property. The respondent no. 3 had executed a sale deed on 25.6.1984 in respect of plot no. 218 area 1 acre 10 decimals in favour of the petitioners for a consideration of Rs.20,000/-. The said sale deed, which has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, contained recital to the effect that in case a sum of Rs.20,000/- is returned back within a period of six  years the same would be acceptable  to the petitioners and the land would be reconveyed to the respondent no. 3 by the petitioners.

The respondent no. 3, it appears, wanted the land to be reconveyed back to him for which purpose  he instituted  Original Suit No.  461 of 1991 for specific performance in his favour. The suit was decreed on 16.4.1993 and orders were passed directing the petitioners (defendants in the suit) to execute the sale deed in favour of respondent no. 3 Sauji Ram (plaintiff). The learned trial court while decreeing the suit has also recorded that one of the defendant witness D.W.1 had deposed before the court that the defendants were prepared to reconvey the property provided the entire consideration money together with costs of the proceeding is paid to them. It was also directed that a sum of Rs.20,000/- would be paid by the respondent no. 3 to the petitioners along with 6 % interest with effect from  25.6.1984 and  time upto 31.5.1993 was granted by the learned trial court for depositing of the said amount.

From the record it appears that respondent no. 3 (plaintiff) moved an application on 21.5.1993 for extension of time on account of ailment in order to enable him to deposit the decretal amount upon which the learned Munsif Magistrate granted four days time subject to payment of Rs.100/- as costs. However, it appears that the amount was not deposited with regard to which an explanation was afforded by the respondent no. 3 before the learned trial court that he could not make the deposit as he was incorrectly advised by his lawyer that since the civil court is closed for summer vacation in June hence money will be deposited on the reopening of the civil court on July 1, 1993. Thus, the money was not deposited upto the month of June and an application was moved on 6.7.1993 for further extension of time on the ground of ailment of the plaintiff wherein he alleged that he had fallen ill and was in hospital from 1.7.1993 to 3.7.1993.The said application dated 6.7.1993 for further extension of time was allowed on 21.7.1993 and time was granted upto 22.7.1993 to deposit the entire amount which was allowed on payment of Rs.200/- as costs. It is further borne out from the recital in the revisional court's order that the plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 32,457/- being the entire decretal amount along with the interest and the costs imposed before the learned trial court. The facts narrated herein above would indicate that the deposit was not made within the time as fixed originally under the decree and subsequent extensions were also sought which was granted by the learned trial court. The default for deposit was in respect of the entire decretal amount.

From a perusal of the order dated 21.7.1993 it is clear that the application was allowed in the plaintiff's case was accepted and the delay in depositing the amount was condoned. The grounds of acceptance by the learned trial court were two fold; firstly, the plaintiff had been incorrectly advised by his lawyer in the civil court about the closure of the court in the month of June and, secondly, the plaintiff was genuinely suffering from ailment and since both these  situations were beyond his control, therefore, the principles of natural justice demanded that he be extended  the benefit of extension  of time  in order to prevent any miscarriage of justice. It was further held by the learned trial court that the plaintiff cannot be penalized in a situation like this and correspondingly the defendant can be adequately compensated. The application was, therefore, allowed on payment of Rs.300/- as costs.

The petitioners preferred a revision before the learned District Judge and urged that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Kumari Sushila Devi Versus Mohammad Shafi reported in 1982 AWC 218, the learned trial court had no jurisdiction to enlarge and extend the time of deposit being made by the plaintiff in terms of the decree. Relying on the said decision it was urged that section 148 C.P.C. cannot be  pressed into service in extending time  in respect of the conditional decree. The revisional court dismissed the revision holding that the judgment in the case of  Kumari Sushila Devi (supra) was no longer  good law in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to in the order of the revisional court.

The revisional court has relied upon a judgment  of the Apex Court reported in (1978) 2 SCC 116(Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Versus  Sudha Rani Devi and others. In the said decision one of the issues raised was as to whether on failure to deposit the decretal amount the same would result in the dismissal of the suit. The question of extension of time  was also involved therein and the Court upheld the orders granting extension of time in the said case. However, the said decision has not discussed the principles of the application of Section 148 C.P.C. in the case of pre-emption decree as presently involved.

The next judgment relied upon by the learned revisional court is in the case of Ganesh Prasad Kesri and another Versus Laxmi Narain reported in  (1985) 3 SCC 53, wherein general principles of the applicability as regards to section 148 C.P.C. were laid down as under:

"10.This construction also commends to us for the additional reason that where the court fixes a time to do a thing, the court always retains the powers to extend the time for doing so. Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. The Principle of this section must govern in not whittling down the discretion conferred on the court."

The revisional court rested its conclusion ultimately by relying upon the decision in the case of  Johri Singh Versus Sukhpal Singh and others reported in (1989) 4 SCC 403.  This case extensively deals with the power of the court to extend the time in respect of the decree in pre-emption suit as contemplated under Order 20 Rule 14 C.P.C. At this juncture it would be appropriate to quote Order 20 Rules 12-A and 14 C.P.C.

"Rule 12-A- Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property- Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property orders that the purchase-money or other sum be paid to the purchaser or lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made.

" Rule 14-Decree in pre-emption suit- (1) Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall: -

(a) specify a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be so paid: and

(b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs ( if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have  accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not  so paid, the suit shall be deemed with costs.

(2)Where the Court has adjudicated upon rival

claims to pre-emption. The decree shall direct: -

(a) if an in so far as the  claim decreed are equal in degree, that the  claim of each  pre-emption complying with the  provisions of  sub-rule (1) shall take  effect in respect of a  proportionate share of the  property including any proportionate share in respect of  which the claim of any pre-emption failing to comply with the said provisions would, but for such default, have taken effect; and

(b) if and in so far as the claims decreed are different  in degree, that the claim of the  inferior pre-emption shall not take effect unless and until the superior pre-emption has failed to comply with the said  provisions.

The Apex Court in the case of Johri Singh (supra) has specified and distinguished the various categories of cases to indicate the circumstances in which the court would be justified in granting extension of time. Paragraphs 17 to 20 of the said decision are extracted below:

"17.Section 148 deals with enlargement of time                    and provides:

"Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."

18.This section empowers the court to extend the time fixed by it even after the expiry of the period originally fixed. It by implication allows the court to enlarge the time before the time originally fixed.  The use of the word '' may' shows that the power is discretionary and the court is, therefore, entitled to take into account the conduct of the party praying for such extension.

19.From the above decision one could distinguish the cases of non-deposit of the whole of the purchase money within the fixed time where there was no stay order granted by the appellate court from the cases of non-deposit of the decretal amount consequent upon a stay order granted by the appellate court. In the first category of above cases the provision of Order  XX Rule 14(1) would be strictly applicable, the provision being mandatory as was held in Naguba case. In the second category of above cases, it would be necessary to examine the nature and effect of the stay order on the deemed deposit of the suit and also to see whether a fresh period is fixed thereby as were the cases in Datteraya and Jogdhayan.

20.In the third category of cases, namely, non-deposit of only a relatively small fraction of the purchase money due to inadvertent mistake whether or not caused by any action of the court, the court has the discretion under section 148 CPC to extend and time even though the time fixed has already expired provided it is satisfied that the mistake is bona fide and was not indicative of negligence or inaction as was the case in Jogdhayan. The court will extend the time when it finds that the mistake was the result of, or induced by, an action of the court applying the  maxim ''actus curiae  neminem gravabit'- an act of the court shall prejudice no man, as was the case  in Jang Singh. While it would be necessary to consider the facts of the case to determine whether the inadvertent mistake was due to any action of the court it would be appropriate to find that the ultimate permission to deposit the challaned amount is that of the court."

Another decision which deserves to be quoted in this regard is the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Govardhan Singh Versus Barsati reported in  1972, ALJ, 169 paragraph 7. The Full Bench was also called upon to answer this very issue as to whether the court had power to extend the time even when the application for extension of time was made after the expiry of the time fixed by the court. The Full Bench answered the question in the following terms: -

" In our opinion, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad is no longer good law. Even in cases where an order is made by the Court for doing a thing within a  particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the Court  has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under section 148 C.P.C. to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction."

A perusal of the facts of the present case discloses that the witness who had deposed  as D.W. 1  on behalf of the defendant had clearly stated that the defendants were  agreed to reconvey the property provided the entire amount of consideration together with the interest and costs incurred by the defendant are paid back to them. The conduct of the defendant-petitioner before the trial court and as recorded in the judgment and decree dated 16.4.1993 clearly explains that the defendant-petitioners were prepared to reconvey the property provided they were favoured with the payment prayed for by them. Apart from this, the trial court has recorded reasons which, in my opinion, are cogent reasons for allowing the application for extension of time treating the conduct of the plaintiff-applicant to be bonafide and genuine. The trial court has rightly believed  the plaintiff's version that the plaintiff was prevented on account of situation beyond his control in making the deposit as per the judgment dated 16.4.1993. In revision, the said discretion exercised by the trial court was upheld. Thus, the discretion exercised by the trial court and as affirmed by the revisional court cannot be said to be infirm on any ground. From the decisions cited at Bar and the decision of the Full Bench referred to herein above it is clear that the trial court was empowered to extend the time exercising jurisdiction under section 148 C.P.C. Even, otherwise, I am of the opinion, that substantial justice has been done between the parties and as such it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Before parting with the case it would not be out of place to mention that the legislature amended the provisions of Section 148 I.P.C. by Act No. 46 of 1999, which has come into effect from 1.7.2002. The amended section 148 I.P.C. now restricts the power of the court to extend time upto 30 days in total. Thus, under the amended section the power to grant extension has been preserved to the outer limit of 30 days only. The amended section 148 I.P.C. is quoted herein below: -

"148.Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding thirty days in total), even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."

However, the aforesaid amended provisio0n is no

Relevant for the present controversy inasmuch as in this case the order was passed in the year 1999 whereas the mended provision has come into effect only in July 2002.

From what has been stated herein above, this Court is clearly of the view that the instant writ petition is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed.  There shall be no orders as to cost.

D/-

Mahmood.


Copyright

Reproduced in accordance with s52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court Websites

Advertisement

dwi Attorney | dui attorney | dwi | dui | austin attorney | san diego attorney | houston attorney | california attorney | washington attorney | minnesota attorney | dallas attorney | alaska attorney | los angeles attorney | dwi | dui | colorado attorney | new york attorney | new jersey attorney | san francisco attorney | seattle attorney | florida attorney | attorney | london lawyer | lawyer michigan | law firm |

Tip:
Double Click on any word for its dictionary meaning or to get reference material on it.