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Yogendra Kumar Yadav v. The Chairman Municipal Board, Deoria And Ors - WRIT - A No. 30412 of 1991  RD-AH 1624 (3 December 2004)
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30412 of 1991
Yogendra Kumar Yadav vs. The Chairman, Municipal Board,
Deoria and others
Hon'ble Vineet Saran, J
Heard Sri Amarendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vashistha Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and have perused the record.
The brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner was the only son of Ram Lal, who was an employee of the Municipal Board, Deoria. One Shyam Lal, brother of Ram Lal , was also an employee of the Municipal Board, Deoria. Both Ram Lal and Shyam Lal died in harness on 12.8.1990 on 14.4.1990 respectively. On the death of Ram Lal, his widow (the mother of the petitioner) was on 23.1.1991 given appointment on compassionate ground under the Dying in Harness Rules. On the same date the petitioner was also given appointment on a class IV post on compassionate grounds in place of Shyam Lal treating him to be the son of Shyam Lal. The said appointment had been given by the then Administrator of the Municipal Board. However, thereafter when the elected body took charge, on finding that the petitioner was not the real son of Shyam Lal but was claiming to be his adopted son, the Chairman of the Municipal Board re-opened the matter. Since there was no valid adoption deed executed in favour of the petitioner under the Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1956 and also considering that the widow of Ram Lal, who is the mother of the petitioner, had already been given appointment on compassionate ground, the temporary appointment given to the petitioner had been cancelled by the order dated 10.5.1991. Aggrieved by the said order dated 10.5.1991 the petitioner has filed this writ petition on the ground that as the petitioner was the adopted son of Shyam Lal, he would be entitled for appointment under the Dying in harness Rules in place of Shyam Lal because an adopted son has the same rights as the real son and also that the order has been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
It may be true that an adopted son has the same rights as the real son for the purposes of appointment under the Dying in Harness Rules but only when the adoption is legal and valid. In view of the fact that there was no valid registered deed of adoption in favour of the petitioner, he cannot be treated as a legally adopted child of Shyam Lal. Even otherwise it is highly improbable that the only son is given away by the parents in adoption to some other person, may be his own brother. The mother of the petitioner has already got appointment on compassionate ground on the death of the real father of the petitioner i.e. Ram Lal. It appears that the case of adoption has been made out only for the purposes of seeking appointment on compassionate ground on the death of Shyam Lal who happens to be the uncle of the petitioner.
Appointment on compassionate grounds should not and cannot be made an alternate source of recruitment. The common man waiting for his turn for appointment and holding eligibility and qualification would thus not be able to seek appointment if the appointments on compassionate grounds are permitted to be given in such manner. The provision for appointment on compassionate ground under the Dying in Harness Rules has been made to tide away the sudden financial crisis which the family of the deceased may suffer because of the sudden death of the sole bread earner. In the present case when the widow of Ram Lal, who is the mother of the petitioner, has already been provided employment on compassionate ground, it cannot be said that the requirement of job on compassionate ground was there for the petitioner also as the family of the petitioner had got sufficient respite on his mother having been provided employment. In the above facts and circumstances I do not find any good ground for interference with the impugned order under this equitable writ jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons this writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to cost.
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